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ALLOCATION OF PROPERTY APPRECIATION:
A STATUTORY APPROACH TO THE
JUDICIAL DIALECTIC
LAWRENCE PONOROFF*
ABSTRACT

Many, perhaps the majority, of Chapter 13 cases end up being
converted to Chapter 7. The converted Chapter 7 case is not a new
case, it is a continuation of the case that was commenced with the
filing of the original Chapter 13 petition. However, there are important structural differences between the two chapters, including over
what constitutes property of the estate. This creates some thorny
issues surrounding whether property of the estate as generally defined in section 541(a) of the Bankruptcy Code or property of the
estate as specifically defined in Chapter 13 controls in determining
the scope of the estate in the converted case. Initially, the circuits
were split on this question as it related to earnings and other property acquired by the debtor after filing. Congress resolved that matter in 1994, adopting a new section 348(f)(1), which makes clear
that such after-acquired property is excluded from the Chapter 7
estate. In making that choice, the legislative history cited the strong
public policy favoring repayment over liquidation and the desire
to avoid creating disincentives to debtors' choosing Chapter 13 at
the onset. However, the text new subsection did not address all the
issues affecting property of the estate, including allocation of increases in the net value of property that was in existence at the
time of filing. The legislative history, however, did, suggesting that
the intent was to permit the debtor to at least retain increases
attributable to payments made secured debt. Nevertheless, once
more, the courts have split on this issue, with the most antipodal
positions explicable in terms of differing approaches to statutory
interpretation. Moreover, there are any number of intermediate
positions that can be found in the decisional law between those
• Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law.
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extremes. This wide spectrum of different approaches to the problem
has introduced a high degree of costly uncertainty and disuniformity into the system. In attempting to supply a definitive answer,
this Article determines that both of the extreme positions-all
such property stays with the debtor, or all such property inures to
the Chapter 7 estate-are plausible but neither is without its shortcomings. Therefore, it concludes the only way definitively to resolve the matter without the inordinate delay entailed in waiting
for the issue to work its way through the circuit courts, is through
legislation. Therefore, this Article, lays out the language and rationale for such a reform effort. It is contended that this alternative approach addresses the weaknesses in all of the current positions
and represents overall a solution that better advances the core policies underlying the consumer bankruptcy system.
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INTRODUCTION

Chapter 13 of the federal bankruptcy code is an enigma.!
Going all the way back to its predecessor, Chapter XIII of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898,2 an individual debt adjustment proceeding
was perceived as offering a superior alternative to a straight liquidation, less stigmatizing to debtors and providing greater returns
to creditors. a And yet, despite Congress's relentless efforts, first with
carrots and then with sticks, 4 to make Chapter 13 the chapter of
' References in this Article to the "Code" or the "Bankruptcy Code" are to
the current law of bankruptcy, which is found in Title 11 of the United States
Code. 11 U.S. C. (originally enacted as Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549). It was enacted on November 6, 1978, as tlte Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (referred to in
text as the "1978 Act') and governs all cases filed on or after October 1, 1979.
• Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549). Chapter XIII was added to the 1898 Act by the
Chandler Act of 1938. ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (codified prior to repeal in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.); Timotlty W. Dixon & David G. Epstein, Where Did
Chapter 13 Come From and Where Should It Go?, 10 AM. BANKR.INST. L. REV.
741, 757 (2002) (noting tltat Chapter XIII was ''invented'' by Valentine J.
Nesbit, a South Carolinian who had moved to Birmingham, Alabama).
• In the House Report accompanying the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
Congress expressed the view tltat both the debtor and tlte debtor's creditors
would benefit under Chapter 13, as compared with straight liquidation. See
H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 118 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
6078-79; see also DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT'S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF
BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 133 (2001) (stating that when Chapter XIII
was enacted, lawmakers assumed many individual debtors would prefer this
option as less stigmatizing).
4 "In designing chapter 13 in the 1970s, Congress sought to lure debtors to
its environs by dangling delectable carrots." Lawrence Ponoroff, Rethinking
Chapter 13, 59 ARiz. L. REV. 1, 22 [hereinafter Rethinking Chapter 13]. Most
notably, this included the promise of a "superdischarge" on plan completion.
Id. at 40. In its original form, section 1328(a) only excepted two types of debt
from the full-payment discharge: (1) debts on which the last scheduled payment was due after tlte end of the plan, and (2) debts for domestic support
obligations falling under § 523(a)(5). 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (1978), amended by
Act of Apr. 20, 2005. To Congress's chagrin, however, many debtors still chose
Chapter 7, even when they might have had sufficient wherewitltal and potential to successfully complete a Chapter 13 plan. Rethinking Chapter 13, supra
note 4, at 9. Thus, Congress began restricting access to Chapter 7 as a way of
indirectly steering debtors into Chapter 13. ld. These efforts culminated witlt
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub.
L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
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choice for consumer and even some small business bankruptcies, 5 it
has simply not worked out that way. a
Add to this mix the fact that roughly two-thirds of Chapter 13 cases never make it to plan completion. 7 As jarring as it
may at first seem, this statistic is neither a surprise, 8 nor does it
11 U.S.C.) [hereinafter 2005 Act], which, incongruously, simultaneously made
Chapter 13 less appealing. See Rethinking Chapter 13, supra note 4, at 9--10
(describing the efforts by Congress between 1984 and 2005 to tighten access
to Chapter 7 and, at the same time, make Chapter 13 less debtor-friendly).
6 Unlike old Chapter XIII, Chapter 13 is not limited to wage earners. 11
U.S. C. § 1304. Thus, a business run as a sole proprietorship could file Chapter 13 if it met the eligibility requirements set forth in 11 U.S.C. section 109(e),
although there would be no separation of business and personal assets in the
case. ld. Section 1304 does, however, have special provisions applicable only
to Chapter 13 debtors who are engaged in a business. Id.
• Moreover, the relative frequency of Chapter 13 filings in comparison with
Chapter 7 is widely divergent from one region of the country to another. See
Ed Flynn, Chapter 13 Case Outcomes by State, 33-Aug. AM. BANKR. INST. J. 40
(2014); Scott F. Norberg & Nadja Schreiber Compo, Report on an Empirical
Study of District Variations, and the Role of Judges, Trustees and Debtors' Attorneys in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Cases, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 431 (2007). This
was similarly true under old Chapter XIII. In its Final Report, the Commission established by Congress in 1970 to "study, evaluate and recommend changes
to [the existing bankruptcy law]." Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84
Stat. 468, noted the surprisingly wide variation in rates of usage of former
chapter XIII from district to district. See H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. 1, at 156--57
(1973).
7 Scott F. Norberg & Andrew J. Velkey, Debtor Discharge and Creditor Repayment in Chapter 13, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 473, 476 (2006) (finding a thirtythree percent completion rate in a seven-district study for plans of chapter 13
debtors who filed in 1994); Sara S. Greene et al., Cracking the Code, An Empirical Analysis of Consumer Bankruptcy Outcomes, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1031, 1042
(201 7) (finding that post-BAPCPA the completion rate was slightly higher than
the "one-third'' completion statistic that has endured for decades).
8 As originally enacted in 1978, section 1322(c) limited the period of repayment under a plan to three years, unless, for cause, the court approved a
longer period of up to but not exceeding five years. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92
Stat. 2549. After the BAPCPA, that rule was retained for debtors whose
current monthly income times twelve is less than the state's median for a family
of the same size as the debtor's family. See 11 U.S. C. § 1322(d)(2). For abovemedian debtors, however, the plan may provide for payments over a period of
up to five years. Id. §§ 1322(d)(1), 1325(b)(4)(A). This is a long time to count
on clear skies and fair seas calm winds for a debtor who, in order to confirm
his or her plan, must allocate all of his or her projected disposable income to
plan payments. See id. § 1325(b).
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necessarily represent a problem.9 However, most of these "failed"
Chapter 13 cases end up being converted to Chapter 7.10 This is
where a question emerges over who is entitled to any postpetition, pre-conversion increase in the net value of the debtor's interest in property over and above the sum of secured claims
against and exemptions in such property. 11
To illustrate, let us assume John and Kimberly Castleman
file a petition under Chapter 13. They list in their schedules,
required under section 521(a)(2), their personal residence with a
stated value of $500,000. They also list a debt secured by their
residence with an outstanding principal balance of $375,077. The
Castlemans reside in Washington State-a non-opt-out jurisdiction for purposes of section 522(b)(3)-and elect the applicable
state law homestead exemption in the amount of $124,923. This
is just seventy-seven dollars below the maximum homestead that
can be claimed.12
• A Chapter 13 case that stops an imminent foreclosure or provides some
other temporary relief is not necessarily a failure even though plan payments
are never completed and a discharge is never granted. See, e.g., Branigan v.
Bateman (In re Bateman), 515 F.3d 272, 283 (4th Cir. 2008) (noting the protections or benefits available under chapter 13, other than discharge, that might
be incentive for a debtor to file for relief even when discharge is not available).
10 The debtor has the absolute right to convert a Chapter 13 case. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1307(a). The absence of any restriction or limitation in sections 1307(a) and
(b) on a debtor's right, respectively, to convert or dismiss a Chapter 13 case
derives largely from the fact that Chapter 13 is not an option for an involuntary bankruptcy. Id. § 303(a) (involuntary cases may only be brought under
Chapter 7 or 13). Thus, if the debtor was not permitted an absolute right to
bail on a Chapter 13, this could indirectly result in an involuntary Chapter 13.
See id. It might also place an undesirable disincentive in the path of the debtor's
election to proceed under Chapter 13 in the first place. See In re Wegner, 243
B.R. 731, 734 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2000) (stating that Congress has encouraged debtors
to file a Chapter 13 case by permitting them to dismiss the case or convert the
case to Chapter 7 without detrimental consequences). Any other party in interest may petition the court for conversion upon a showing of cause. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1307(c).
" See In re Barrera, 620 B.R. 645, 652--54 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2020).
12 WASH. REV. CODE§ 6.13.030 (2021). Exemptions, of course, are subordinate to valid liens against the property save for the limited ability of the
debtor to avoid certain exemption-intpairing liens under § 522(t). See Lawrence
Ponoroff, Exemption Impairing Liens Under Bankruptcy Code Section 522(F):
One Step Forward and One Step Back, 70 UNN. COLO. L. REV. 1, 12 (1999)
[hereinafter Exemption Impairing Liens].
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The Castlemans' Chapter 13 plan, which calls for cure and
maintenance of the mortgage debt in accordance with section
1322(b)(5), 13 is confirmed in 2018. The plan is scheduled to run
for five years, but sometime in 2021 the Castlemans encounter a
financial setback and are no longer able to make the payments
called for under the plan. So, rather than see their case dis·
missed, they move under 1307(b) to have the case converted to a
Chapter 7 liquidation. That motion is granted.
The Castlemans hope the Chapter 7 trustee will abandon
their home since, as of the date their petition was flied, the mortgage lien and the homestead exemption together consumed more
than the full value of the property, at least as stated. However,
perhaps fueled by a low interest rate environment and demographic shifts caused by the Covid-19 Pandemic, housing values
have apparently risen dramatically in their neighborhood. Thus,
the trustee appointed in the Chapter 7 case has applied to the
court to declare that any excess value in the property over and
above the sum of the first mortgage and the homestead exemption belongs to the estate, including equity arising from payments
made during the aborted Chapter 13 plan. The Castlemans oppose
the motion, claiming that the increase in value of their home equity
between the date of the original petition and the date of conversion is excluded from property of the Chapter 7 estate and, thus,
belongs to them.
Both the trustee and the Castlemans rely on section 348(f)(1)
to support their respective positions, 14 which does tinkle the
ivories all around the issue but never quite strikes a chord. It
provides as follows:
(f)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), when a case under
chapter 13 of this title is converted to a case under another
chapter under this title--(A) property of the estate in the converted case shall consist of
property of the estate, as of the date of filing of tile petition,
that remains in the possession of or is under the control of the
debtor on the date of conversion;
13 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) (providing the debtor with the option to cure defaults and maintain payments on any claim as to which tile last payment is
due after the date on which the final payment under the plan is due).
14 See 11 U.S. C. § 348(±)(1).
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(B) valuations of property and of allowed secured claims in
the chapter 13 case shall apply only in a case converted to a case
under chapter 11 or 12, but not in a case converted to a case
under chapter 7, with allowed secured claims in cases under
chapters 11 and 12 reduced to the extent that they have been
paid in accordance with the chapter 13 plan; .... 15

With only a little dramatic license taken,16 these are the
facts of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of
Washington's decision in In re Castleman,l1 which held in favor
of the trustee based on what it regarded as the plain language of
the above-cited statute.lB However, as the court noted, other decisions take the view that section 348(£)(1) on its face does not
resolve the issue.1 9 Therefore, focusing presumed congressional
intent as discerned from legislative history, 20 these cases award
postpetition, pre-conversion appreciation to the debtor. 21 There
is, however, even among these decisions, considerable ambiguity
and uncertainty as to whether a distinction ought to be drawn
between equity build-up due to paydown of secured debt, on the
15 Paragraph (2) to subsection 348(f), referred to in the preambulatory language of paragraph (f)(l), applies if the conversion is found to have been undertaken in bad faith. Id. The 2005 Act amended subparagraph (B) to read as it
currently does and also added a new paragraph (C), all as discussed more fully
infra notes 110-14 and 223 and accompanying text.
16 While the circumstances recounted here have been invented, that may
have accounted for the appreciation in value of the debtors' home, as well as
the reasons for their decision to convert their Chapter 13 case, the somewhat
suspicious coincidence between the debtors' stated equity in their property, as
scheduled, and the homestead exemption maximum come directly from the
facts of the case. See In re Castleman, 631 B.R. 914, 914--15 (Bankr. W.D. Wash.
June 24, 2021).
17 Id.
18 Id. at 921. For this reason, the court ignored legislative history that accompanied enactment of section 348(f)(l) in 1994 indicating that the new provision was to avoid the disincentive to Chapter 13 filings that would be created if
equity created by payments on secured debt during the Chapter 13 case became
part of the Chapter 7 case. H.R. Rep. No. 103-835, at 57 (1994), reprinted in
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3366 [hereinafter H.R. Rep. No. 103-835].
19 In re Castleman, 631 B.R. at 2-3.
2o See, e.g., In re Barrera, 620 B.R. 645, 652-54 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2020), affd,
No. C0-20-003, 2020 WL 5869458 (B.A.P. lOth Cir. (Colo.) Oct. 2, 2020), aff'd,
Rodriguez v. Barrera (In re Barrera), 2022 WL 163891, NO. 201376 (lOth Cir.
Jan. 19, 2022); see also infra text accompanying notes 60-64.
21 See In re Barrera, 620 B.R. at 652-54.
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one hand, and increases in value attributable to market appreciation, on the other.22
Given the large number of Chapter 13 cases that end up
in Chapter 7, 23 this is not a trivial matter. The overall health and
integrity of the consumer bankruptcy system are impaired by
the existence of such a sharp split in the case law, producing nonuniform, disparate outcomes from district to district. 24 Moreover,
the unpredictability over entitlement to post-filing appreciation
undermines rational decision making by both debtors and secured lenders, producing reluctance to attempt repayment over
liquidation in the case of the former, and causing lenders to build
an inefficient risk premium into the cost of credit ex ante.25 However, proving nothing is impossible, in a sense both lines of authority are correct, although neither produces a very satisfactory
result.26 Thus, the situation clamors for a legislative solution that
both provides clear and unequivocal guidance and harmonizes
the law with the foundational policy objectives implicated in
individual bankruptcy cases.
In aspiring to provide that solution, Part I of this Article
explores the multiple lines of authority regarding post-filing, preconversion appreciation in the debtor's property.27 Part II then
examines the governing statute and the circumstances surrounding
its enactment and subsequent amendment.2s Part III sets out
both the strengths and the flaws associated with each of the competing views concerning when to value property-the date of filing
versus the date of conversion-concluding neither is optimal under
See infra Section lB.
See Norberg & Velkey, supra note 7, at 476; Greene et al., supra note 7,
at 1042.
24 And sometimes even within the same district. See infra note 220 and accompanying text.
25 See Mark J. Roe & Frederick Tung, Breaking Bankruptcy Priority: How
Rent-Seeking Upends the Creditor's Bargain, 99 VA. L. REV. 1235, 1273 (2013)
(explaining how uncertainty with respect to priority would cause creditors hedge
against a loss in value of their collateral by either raising the cost of credit or
curtailing their lending activity). The same might be said of uncertainty with
respect to property appreciation during the course of a Chapter 13 case that
eventually winds up in Chapter 7.
2s See id.
27 See infra Part I.
2s See infra Part II.
22

23
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the current regime. 29 Accordingly, Part N lays out a legislative
reform proposal that resolves the disagreement over whether
the debtor or the estate receives the benefit of post-filing, pre·
conversion increases in net value, taking into account increases
due to both debt reduction and market appreciation. 3 Finally,
Part V provides the rationale for the recommended approach,
which prizes the debtor's fresh start but also includes protection
for unsecured creditors against undervaluation of property in
the Chapter 13 case. 31 It is submitted that the this reconceptualized approach would be consonant with applicable policy considerations, including those that were persuasive in connection with
the Supreme Court's holding on a related issue that was also left
unresolved by section 348(f)(1).32

°

I. COMPETING VIEWS
A. Castleman and Its Forebears
The decision in Castleman is in accord, or at least partially
in accord, with authority from several other districts that have
awarded appreciation to the trustee in the converted Chapter 7
case based on the language of section 541(a)(6), which provides
that all "proceeds, product, offspring, rents or profits of or from
property of the estate" constitute property of the estate.aa For example, in one decision, In re Wegner,34 the court concluded that,
•• See infra Part III.
80 See infra Part IV.
"' See infra Part V.
82 See 11 U.S. C. § 348(t)(1). The related issue concerns entitlement to undistributed plan payments and is discussed infra notes 126-27.
88 See, e.g., In re Potter, 228 B.R. 422, 424 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1999) ("Except
to the extent of the debtor's potential exemption rights, post-petition appreciation in the value of property accrues for the benefit of the trustee.'); In re
Moyer, 421 B.R. 587, 594 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2007); In re Shipman, 344 B.R.
493, 495 (Bankr. N.D. W.Va. 2006) (noting that in a Chapter 7 case "the trustee is
entitled to any postpetition appreciation in value of the property"); In re Bregni,
215 B.R. 850, 854 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997); In re Paolella, 85 B.R. 974, 977
(Ban.kr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (''Because sale does not generally, if ever, occur simultaneously with formation of a bankruptcy estate, § 541(a)(6) mandates that
the estate receive the value of the property at the time of the sale. This value may
include appreciation or be enhanced by other circumstances creating equity
which occur postpetition.').
84 See 243 B.R. 731, 731 (Ban.kr. D. Neb. 2000).
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under the then-extant version of section 348(f)(1), 35 the $9,500
increase in the market value of debtor's home between the filing
of the Chapter 13 petition and the date of conversion belonged to
the debtor and was not property of this Chapter 7 estate. 36 Conversely, however, the court ruled that the $2,100 of additional
equity attributable to principal payments made during the pendency of the Chapter 13 case constituted property of the new
Chapter 7 estate but could then be excluded from the estate under an applicable exemption, determined as of the date of conversion. a? The court was of the view, probably mistakenly so, as that
the pre-2005 version of subsection (f)(1)(B) mandated that market
appreciation belonged to the debtor.39 However, the court offered
no convincing explanation why the same interpretation did not
apply to equity created by payment on the secured debt, stating
only: "[s]ection 348 does not explicitly protect an equity cushion
that is created by payments made during the pendency of the
Chapter 13 case."4D
For a review of the changes made to section 348(±)(1) by the 2005 Act, see
infra text accompanying notes 110--13. Presumably, the Wegner court would
come out differently on this issue under the statute as amended. Compare In
re Wegner, 243 B.R. at 735, with 11 U.S.C. § 348(f).
86 In re Wegner, 243 B.R. at 734. Subparagraph (B) of section 348(±)(1) was
amended by the 2005 Act to provide that valuations of property in the Chapter 13 case do not apply in the case of a conversion to Chapter 7. See infra
text accompanying note 110.
87 In re Wegner, 243 B.R. at 736 (applying as precedent In re Lindberg, 735
F.2d 1087 (8th Cir. 1984), which, although decided before adoption of section
348(f), was still authoritative because that provision addresses after-acquired property, not increases in equity to existing property created by debt reduction).
88 See infra note 39 (regarding the change made by the 2005 Act); see also
text accompanying notes 113--17 (discussing the irrelevance of the valuation
provision in section 348(f)(1)(B) to the question under section 348(f)(1)(A) of
whether postpetition appreciation in value belonged to the debtor or the estate). Nevertheless, a number of cases decided prior to the 2005 Act relied, as
presumably the court did in Wegner, on the theory that confirmation of the
debtor's Chapter 13 plan constituted an implicit finding that the property had
the value ascribed to it in the debtor's schedules and plan. See, e.g., Warren v.
Peterson, 298 B.R. 322, 325 (N.D. TIL 2003); In re Slack, 290 B.R. 282, 285-86
(Bankr. D. N.J. 2003); In re Page, 250 B.R. 465, 466 (Bankr. D. N.H. 2000).
39 11 U.S. C. § 348(f)(1)(B) (1994). Prior to the 2005 Act, subparagraph (B)
provided that vsluations in Chapter 13 applied in all converted cases and not just
those converted to Chapters 11 or 12. The changes to section 348(f)(1) occasioned at the hands of the 2005 Act are discussed infra notes 100 and 110--14.
40 In re Wegner, 243 B.R. at 735. The court did not continue on to explain the
affirmative basis for awarding the equity build-up to the trustee, but presumably
86
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In In re Goins, 41 the bankruptcy court reached exactly the
opposite result from Wegner; namely, that the estate was the beneficiary of any increase in value due to market appreciation, 42 but
that any equity build-up attributable to reduction in the principal balance of the debt secured by such property inured to the
debtor. 43 However, the precedential value of the holding has to
be tempered by the fact that the trustee and the debtor stipulated
that the debtor was entitled to the principal reductions on the home
mortgage loan.44 Thus, the court simply acknowledged and enforced the agreement of the parties, without necessarily providing any hint on how it would have resolved the matter if it had
been contested.45
In Castleman itself, while the court recognized the distinction
between an increase in the debtor's equity due to market factors
the answer lies in § 541(a)(6). See also Kakos v. Stevenson (In re Kakos), No.
13-57575, 2015 WL 5212033, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 4, 2015) (although involving a somewhat different issue, commenting that there is extensive case
authority for the proposition that property included within the Chapter 7 con·
verted bankruptcy estate includes increases in value to that property, whether
due to appreciation, payments, or other circumstances).
41 In re Goins, 539 B.R. 510, 515 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2015).
42 Id. The Trustee argued that the 2005 Act did away with any notion of
implicit valuation as a result of confirmation in a Chapter 13 case, because
Section 348(f)(1)(B) now expressly provides that valuations from Chapter 13
do not carry over into converted Chapter 7 cases. Id. at 514--15; see also supra
note 36. The court disagreed but found in favor of the trustee nonetheless as
to entitlement to the postpetition appreciation in the property because the real
estate was always property of the estate under section 541(a)(1), and section
541(a)(6) provides that all "proceeds, product, offspring, rents or profits of or
from property of the estate" constitutes property of the estate. In re Goins,
539 B.R. at 515--16 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6)).
48 In re Goins, 539 B.R. at 516. The debtor had decreased the outstanding
mortgage against the property by $27,000 by virtue of payments that had
been made during the pendency of the Chapter 13 case. Id. at 511. The par·
ties disagreed over whether the market value of the property in question had
increased in value between the dates of the petition and the conversion. Id.
44Id.
45 Id. at 516. Indeed, in Castleman, which found any increase in net value
inured to the Chapter 7 estate, the court purported to be following what it
termed the "Goins Approach" to section 348(f)(1). In re Castleman, 631 B.R.
914, 917 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. June 4, 2021). However, in dicta, the Goins court
cited the H.R. Rep. No. 103·835, supra note 18, as lending support to the view
that equity created by debt reduction might be entitled to different treatment
than market appreciation. In re Goins, 539 B.R. at 516.
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versus payments on secured debt during the Chapter 13 case, 46
it ultimately concluded that increases from either source should
be included in the property of the estate in the converted Chapter 7 case. 47 The court's reasoning was that the plain language of
section 348(f)(l)(A) made no such distinction. 48 Under those circumstances, it would be improper, the court concluded, to read such
a proviso on application. 49 The court also rejected the argument
that the plain meaning was demonstrably at odds with congressional intent, 50 which might have provided a basis to deviate from
even unambiguous text in the statute.51 Finally, the opinion in
Castleman observed that its conclusion regarding post-filing, preconversion increases in value was in harmony with related holdings
from the Ninth Circuit regarding the estate's right to postpetition
appreciation of property of the estate under section 541(a)(6).52
Interestingly, the opposite situation was addressed by the
bankruptcy court in In re Lang; 53 namely, whether the debtor would
be responsible to the Chapter 7 trustee for the depreciation in
the value of an asset in excess of the reduction of the lien against
46 In re Castkman, 631 B.R. at 919 (referring to the example in the H.R. Rep.
No. 103-835, supra note 18, at 57, of equity created by paydown of secured debt).
47 Id. (noting that "[t]he new Section 348(f) does not at all address the effect of conversion on paydown of secured debt during the Chapter 13 case or
changes in the value of pre-petition assets."); see also In re Peter, 309 B.R. 792,
795 (Bankr. D. Or. 2004) (holding that equity created by paydown of liens in
Chapter 13 belongs to chapter 7 trustee).
48 In re Castleman, 631 B.R. at 919.
49 Id.
50 Id. (''Where, as here, the statute is clear and consistent with overall legislative intent, the failure to in any manner address the example provided in
the legislative history does not create ambiguity.").
"' Courts will resort to legislative history, even where the plain language
is unambiguous, "where the legislative history clearly indicates that Congress
meant something other than what it said." See, e.g., Perlman v. Catapult Ent.,
Inc. (In re Catapult Ent., Inc.), 165 F.3d 747, 753 (9th Cir. 1999); see also United
States v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 542-43 (1940) (commenting
that if the interpretations of a statute whiclt would produce an absurd result,
it might be rejected in favor of an alternative interpretation consistent with
the legislative purpose).
52 In re Castleman, 631 B.R. at 920. Of course, while this ruling can credibly be cast as consistent with section 541(a)(6) as it relates solely to appreciation, it
comes into conflict with the proviso in section 541(a)(6) excluding earnings
from a debtor's postpetition services in a Chapter 7 case. See infra note 186.
58 In re Lang, 437 B.R. 70, 72 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2010).
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the property occurring during the time her Chapter 13 plan was
pending and prior to conversion.54 Understandably, the court answered the question in the negative, concluding that the debtor
''was obligated only to turn over the depreciated motor vehicle to
Chapter 7 trustee and had no obligation to account for vehicle value
that was lost to depreciation during the roughly four years that
her Chapter 13 case was pending."55 Any other result would have a
measurable deterrent effect on a debtor's willingness to attempt
repayment under Chapter 13.56 The opinion in Castleman pointed
to this ruling as consistent with its view that in the obverse situation the estate enjoys the benefit, 57 although, in fact, consistency
with the policy rationale for Lang would have directed just the
opposite conclusion. 58

B. The Opposing View
A slight majority of reported decisions addressing the issue of
valuation changes postpetition and pre-conversion take the view
that an increase in net value, regardless of source, stays with
the debtor and does not become property of the estate, provided
that the debtor is not found to have been operating in bad faith. 59
Mid. at 72.
55 Id. at 72-73 (rejecting the argument that the 2005 Act amendment to
section 348(f)(l)(B) that the value at the time of the filing of the Chapter 13
petition should control).
66 In re Castleman, 631 B.R. at 918. The court in Lang observed that a
debtor and her creditors may negotiate in connection with the Chapter 13 plan a
provision that allocates the risk ofloss due to depreciation on the debtor, but
that did not occur in this case. In re Lang, 437 B.R. at 73.
57 In re Castleman, 914 B.R. at 920 n.4.
68 In re Lang, 437 B.R. at 72. Losing value that accretes between filing and
conversion penalizes a debtor for attempting Chapter 13 in much the same
way that making a debtor account for a loss in value due to depreciation would
do so. Id.
59 In re Barrera, 620 B.R. 645, 654 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2020), affd, No. BAP
C0-20-003, 2020 WL 5869458 (lOth Cir. BAP (Colo.) Oct. 2, 2020), affd, 22
F.4th 1217 (lOth Cir. 2022). If the debtor is acting in bad faith, section 348(±)(2)
dictates that it is the date of conversion that controls property of the Chapter
7 estate. 11 U.S.C. § 348(±)(2). While this Article was in production, the Tenth
Circuit affirmed the lower courts' rulings in In re Barrera, 22 F.4th 1217 (lOth
Cir. 2022). However, the court limited its holding to cases where the home
had been sold before conversion, finding that identified proceeds represent a
property interest different from the home itself. Id. at 1223. Thus, based on the
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For instance, in In re Barrera,60 the bankruptcy court determined
that the meaning of property for purposes of section 348(f)(1)(A)
was ambiguous, and, thus, turned to the legislative history for
guidance. 61 There, the court found that "Congress' concern [was]
that the Chapter 7 trustee was getting the postpetition increase
in equity in the debtor's home," and that this supports the conclusion that "property" as used in section 348(f)(l)(A) refers to
"property as it existed on the petition date, with all its attributes,
including the amount of equity that existed on that date."62 Following from that interpretation, the court resolved that no distinction ought to be drawn between equity increases due to the
debtor's paydown of liens versus changes occurring as a result of
market forces, 63 noting that "the legislative history points toward [] Congress' intent to leave a debtor who attempts a repayment plan no worse off than he would have been had he flied
a chapter 7 case at the outset."64
The legislative history to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1994, 65 cited by the court in Barrera, left no doubt that section
348(f)(1) was adopted for the purpose of overturning judicial decisions holding that property acquired by the debtor post-flling and
pre-conversion belonged to the Chapter 7 estate rather than the
debtor, fearing that this would otherwise create "a serious disincentive to chapter 13 filings."66 The clear text of the statute is
plain language of section 348(f)(l) the court ruled that the sale proceeds "do
not enter the converted Chapter 7 estate." Id. The court declined to say whether
appreciation would have become property of the Chapter 7 estate if there had been
no sale of the home before conversion to Chapter 7, as both the bankruptcy
court and the BAP had concluded. ld. at 1226.
so In re Barrera, 620 B.R. at 650.
61 Id. at 652. The court described the ambiguity as ''latent," despite its superficial clarity, noting that a statute is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible to being interpreted or ''understood in two or more possible senses or
ways." Id. (citing Nat'! Credit Union Admin Bd. v. Nomura Home Equity Loan,
Inc., 764 F.3d 1199, 1226 (lOth Cir. 2014)).
62 Id. at 653.
63 Id. (suggesting no basis for the distinction in the language of section
348(f)(l)(A) itself or elsewhere in the Code).
64Jd.
65 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 219, 108 Stat.
4106 (1994).
66 See H.R. Rep. No. 103-835, supra note 18, at 57; see also infra notes 81,
100--01.
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certainly consistent with that stated intent.67 However, the issue
in both Castleman and Barrera was not property first acquired
in this gap period, but rather appreciation in net value of property owned by the debtor as of the date of filing attributable to a
build-up in the equity cushion through debt repayment, market
factors, or a combination of both. as Section 348(f)(1) does not speak
directly to that question, either as originally enacted or as later
amended. 69 In explaining its decision to favor the debtor on the
issue, the court in Barrera relied on an example provided by the
House Report,7° an example that the court in Castleman would
later refer to as "unfortunate" and choose to ignore. 71
In an even more recent decision, In re Cofer,72 the bankruptcy court examined both views on postpetition appreciation
and ultimately determined to follow the reasoning of Barrera. 73 In
particular, the court emphasized that the legislative purpose, as
reflected in the House Report, 74 was further ''buttressed by section 348(f)(2) which directs the bankruptcy court to look to the date
of conversion when a [Chapter 13 case] is converted in bad faith,"75
implying that accretions to value in a good faith conversion scenario were to be enjoyed by the debtor.76 Interestingly, unlike the
Barrera decision,77 the court's opinion did not explicitly indicate
either that the court found the language of section 348(f)(1)(A) to
be ambiguous or that it found such language to be irreconcilably in
conflict with the intent of Congress.78 Thus, Cofer does not directly
engage on the issue on which most contrary authorities, such as
See 11 U.S.C. § 348(f) (1994).
See In re Castleman, 631 B.R. 914, 916 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. June 4, 2021);
see also In re Barrera, 620 B.R. at 646.
69 See infra Part II.
70 See supra note 18. The example is reprinted infra note 81.
71 In re Castleman, 631 B.R. at 918-20.
72 In re Cofer, 625 B.R. 194, 199-202 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2021).
73 Id.; see also In re Villescas, No. 19-26403, 2021 WL 3502602, at *4-5
(Bankr. D. Utah July 8, 2021) (following Barrera).
74 See supra note 18 and infra note 81.
75 In re Cofer, 625 B.R. 194 at 202.
76 In re Barrera, 620 B.R. 645, 648 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2020) ("The meaning
of subsection (f)(1)(A) is elucidated by comparing it to subsection (f)(2).").
77 See supra text accompanying note 61.
78 In re Cofer, 625 B.R. at 200-02. Note that Cofer is discussed in more detail infra text accompanying notes 253-61.
67
68
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In re Castleman, 79 have justified their holding favoring the Chapter 7 trustee. so
C. View Somewhere Betwixt and Between
A number of decisions involving equity build·up resulting
from payments made to a secured lender during the Chapter 13
case conclude that debtors should not be penalized for attempting
to repay their debts in Chapter 13, and thus exclude such amounts
from the converted Chapter 7 case.Bl Obviously, these cases are
influenced by the example offered in the House Report explaining the rationale for section 348(f) in relation to payments made
under the Chapter 13 plan prior to conversion.B2 That report did
not, however, address increases in value attributable purely to
market factors, and, because appreciation in value unrelated to the
debtor's payments on a lien encumbering property might be more
79 In re Castleman, 631 B.R. 914, 921 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. June 4, 2021).
so In re Cofer, 625 B.R. at 202-03. Although there are ancillary questions
regarding matters such as drawing a distinction based on the course of the
increase in value, whether secured debt reduction payments were made out·
side the plan, etc. the crux of the current split in the case law is whether sec·
tion 348(f)(1) should be given a purely textualist interpretation, as in Castleman,
or a purposivist construction, as in In re Barrera. Compare In re Castleman,
631 B.R. at 916-18, with In re Barrera, 620 B.R. at 650.
81 See, e.g., In re Pruneskip, 343 B.R. 714, 717 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006)
(stating that value of property should be determined as of the Chapter 13 filing
date); accord In re Robinson, 472 B.R. 854, 857 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012) (find.
ing that equity acquired by debtor through payments under the Chapter 13 plan
was not property ofthe converted Chapter 7 estate); Burt v. Burt (In re Burt),
No. 09·40016·JJR, 2009 WL 2386102, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. July 31, 2009);
In re Nichols, 319 B.R. 854, 857 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2004). But see In re Peter,
309 B.R. 792, 793 (Bankr. D. Or. 2004) (stating that equity created by pay down
ofliens in Chapter 13 belongs to chapter 7 trustee).
82 Supra notes 45-46, supra text accompanying notes 70-75.
For example, a debtor who had $10,000 equity in a home at the
beginning of the case, in a State with a $10,000 homestead
exemption, would have to be counseled concerning the risk that
after he or she paid off a $10,000 second mortgage in the chap·
ter 13 case, creating $10,000 in equity, there would be a risk
that the home could be lost if the case were converted to chap·
ter 7 (which can occur involuntarily). If all of the debtor's property
at the time of conversion is property of the chapter 7 estate,
the trustee would sell the home, to realize the $10,000 in equity
for the unsecured creditors and the debtor would lose the home.
H.R. Rep. No. 95·595, supra note 3, at 57.
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easily reconciled with section 541(a)(6), that could provide a tenable middle ground.B3 Nevertheless, while some of these decisions
do make an express distinction between the two forms of increase
in value,B4 others fail to address the matter at all leaving the
reader in doubt as to which way the court leans on the question. 85
It is also important to factor into the equation that a few
of the decisions made prior to the 2005 Act amendment to section 348(f)(1)(B) were influenced by the argument that, implicitly,
value was decreed by the pre-amended verbiage of subparagraph
(B).86 Thus, since that argument has been rendered moot by the
2005 Act's amendment,B7 it is hard to know on which side of the
fence to place many of the cases decided under the original 1994
version of section 348(f)(1)(B). 88 To further muddy the waters,
there is the contention advanced by some trustees that the outcome might be affected depending upon whether the payments
to the secured lender were made under (versus outside of) the plan,
on the basis that section 348(f)(1)(B) applies only to reduction of secured claims ''to the extent that they have been paid in accordance
H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, supra note 3, at 57; 11 U.S. C. § 541(a)(6) (2018).
See supra text accompanying notes 32--58. In Burt the property at issue
was real estate and, while only dealing increases attributable to the debtor's
payments on the mortgage in Chapter 13, the court observed in diets that "[t]here
is a consensus among courts that equity attributed to appreciation in a property's value may not be claimed by the trustee in a converted case." In re Burt, No.
09-40016-JJR, 2009 WL 2386102, at *6 n.8 (citing In re Niles, 342 B.R. 72, 76
(Bankr. D. Ariz. 2006); In re Wegner, 243 B.R. 731, 734--35 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2000);
In re Page, 250 B.R. 465, 465 (Bankr. D. N.H. 2000)). Of course, assuming it ever
did, such a consensus no longer exists. See supra text accompanying notes 32--58.
85 Pruneskip, Robinson, and Nichols all involved non-appreciating assetsautomobiles-and thus the opinions did not speak separately to the question
of appreciation due to market forces. See In re Pruneskip, 343 B.R. 714, 717
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006); In re Robinson, 472 B.R. 854, 857 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
2012); In re Nichols, 319 B.R. 854, 855 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2004).
86 See Kendall v. Lynch (In re Lynch), 363 B.R. 101, 106--07 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
2007) (holding that ''the relevant valuation date for purposes of § 348(f)(1)(B)
is the Chapter 13 filing date," and absent bad faith, appreciation inures to
the debtors based on the pre-2005 version of the subparagraph); see also In re
Slack, 290 B.R. 282, 287 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2003) (f"mding that when the debtors'
Chapter 13 plan was confirmed there was an implicit finding that the scheduled value was proper and, under section 348(f)(1)(B) upon conversion from
Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 the same value must be used); In re Wegner, 243 B.R. at
734; supra text accompanying notes 34-40.
87 See infra text accompanying note 110.
88 11 U.S.C. § 348(f)(1)(B) (1994).
83
84
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with the chapter 13 plan."B9 Therefore, the argument goes, payments outside the plan do not qualify and produce no new equity
for the debtor.90
In short, the situation, as it currently exists, is fraught. Furthermore, it could get worse, as market factors and debt payments
are not the only two sources of potential increases in the debtor's
postpetition, pre-conversion equity.91 Among other factors, improvements made to the property, e.g., remodeling or renovation
will enhance the value of real property, and tricking out a car or
boat with expensive aftermarket parts can increase the value of
what is ordinarily a depreciating asset. 92 To whose benefit do such
increases redound? Moreover, for courts that draw distinctions between equity build-up due to debt reduction versus market appreciation, renovations can be likened just as easily to payments
on debt as they can market considerations.93
A slightly different situation is posed if the property is destroyed, and the debtor received insurance proceeds, net of any
secured debt, that are still identifiable at the time of conversion.
One view would be that such proceeds are property acquired after filing and, thus, are not included in the Chapter 7 estate by
s9 11 U.S.C. § 348(t)(1)(B) (2018).
oo In re Burt, No. 09-40016-JJR, 2009 WL 2386102, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. Ala.
July 31, 2009). The trustee made this argument in Burt, as a basis to distinguish Pruneskip, but it was rejected by the court on the basis that, regardless
of how payment is made, the claim is still provided for, and being paid pursuant to, the terms of the plan. Compare In re Burt, 2009 WL 2386102, at *4,
with In re Pruneskip, 343 B.R. at 717.
91 Laura G. Tarpley, 5 Ways to Build Equity in Your Home, INSIDER (Feb. 23,
2021, 11:21 AM), https://www .businessinsider.comlpersonal-financelhow-to-build
-equity-in-a-home [https://perma.cc/7BHZ-XZ64]; Danor Aliz, Increase Your Boat's
Value With These Tips, UPSCALE LIVING (June 18, 2020), https://www.up
scalelivingmag.comlincrease-your-boats-value-with-these-tips/ [https://perma
.cc/G8PS-FGCJ]; Goran Radanovic, 15 Mods that Increase the Value of a Car
(10 That Make it Worth Nothing), HOTCARS (Nov. 22, 2018), https://www.hot
cars.com/mods-that-will-increase-the-value-of-a-car-that-make-it-worth-noth
ing/ [https://perma.cc/G3WM-LQUD].
92 Tarpley, supra note 91; Aliz, supra note 91; Radanovic, supra note 91.
93 See In re Burt, 2009 WL 2386102, at *6 (suggesting that there is no reason to treat renovations paid for by the debtor differently than payments of a
mortgage). At the same time, the renovations should also enhance market value
in a manner that mortgage payments do not.
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operation of section 348(f)(1)(A).94 A contrary, but equally plausible, argument would be that such proceeds fall literally under
the inclusive provision of section 541(a)(6).95 The situation becomes
even more abstruse if the debtor uses the net proceeds from the
insurance payout to rebuild the home or purchase an entirely
new one.96 Is the rebuilt or new house after-acquired property
excluded from the Chapter 7 estate by section 348(f)(1)(A), or is
it second-generation proceeds that the estate is entitled to under
section 541(a)(6)? As the materials that follow will demonstrate,
there are simply not a lot of good answers to these questions under
the Code in its current incarnation.97
II. HISTORY OF SECTION 348(F)
Any conversion of a case from one debtor-relief chapter to
another necessarily raises some thorny questions. This is largely
a consequence of the fact that the converted case is a continuation of the existing case, not a new one,9B but the rules governing
the different debtor relief chapters are not identical in a number
of important respects, including over what constitutes property
of the estate.99 One such question that occupied the courts for a
time was should property that is included in a Chapter 13 estate,
but that would be excluded from a Chapter 7 estate, such as postpetition wages, 100 become property of the estate upon conversion. Prior to 1994, the circuits were split on the issue, one view
holding that property acquired post-flling, pre-conversion became
94 11 U.S.C. § 348(t)(l)(A) (2018). That is certainly the distinction that the
Tenth Circuit made in In re Barrera, 22 F.4th 1217, 1223 (lOth Cir. 2022).
95 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) (2018).
96 See supra text accompanying notes 98-129.
97 See supra text accompanying notes 119-27.
98 See 11 U.S.C. § 348(a) (2018) (providing, with minor exceptions, that conversion does not change the date of the filing of the petition).
99 For instance, under section 1306(a) all property acquired after commencement of the case, including earning from postpetition services, are treated as
property of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 1306(a) (2018). The same is true in individual
Chapter 11 cases. 11 U.S.C. § 1115(a)(2018). By contrast in Chapter 7, it is only
property in existence as of the commencement of the case that is included in the
property of the estate, together with certain categories of property that the
debtor acquires or is entitled to acquire within 180 days of filing. See 11 U.S. C.
§§ 541(a)(l), (5).
too See 11 U.S. C. § 541(a)(6).
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property of the estate upon conversion to Chapter 7,101 while the
other ruled that such property stayed with the debtor_102
As has been discussed earlier, section 348(f), including subparagraphs (A) and (B) to paragraph (1), 103 were added to the
Code by the 1994 amendments to resolve the issue_104 Focused
on the aim of not creating disincentives to filing Chapter 13,105
section 348(f)(1)(A) made clear that, absent bad faith, 106 upon conversion to Chapter 7 from Chapter 13 only estate property in
existence as of the date of the Chapter 13 petition filing and still
in the debtor's possession or control is included as part of the new
Chapter 7 estateJ07 Congruent with the aim of encouraging debtors to opt for Chapter 13, the House Report also used the example of a debtor who created a homestead exemption in property by
paying off a second mortgage during the Chapter 13 case, opining that, if all of the debtor's property at the time of conversion
became property of the estate, the debtor would run the risk of
losing the equity to which the homestead attached by virtue of
the elimination of the second lienJOS But that verbiage, of course,
did not directly make it into the statutory text_109
As originally enacted, subparagraph (B) to section 348(f)(1)
provided that valuations of property and permissible secured claims
made prior to conversion from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 applied
in the converted case.no In 2005, subparagraph (B) was amended
to include the current language that pre-conversion valuations
1o1 In re Lybrook, 951 F.2d 136, 137 (7th Cir. 1991) (ruling that an inheritance received more than 180 days after the filing of a Chapter 13 case became
property of the estate upon conversion to Chapter 7).
1o2 In re Young, 66 F.3d 376, 37S-79 (1st Cir. 1995); In re Bobroff, 766 F.2d
797, 803--04 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that a tort claim, which arose after the
debtor filed his petition under Chapter 13, was not property of the estate upon
the case being converted to another chapter).
100 See supra text accompanying notes 65--66.
104 H.R. Rep. No. 103-835, supra note 18, at 57 (adopting the reasoning of
In re Bobroff, 766 F.2d at 803--04).
105 Id. at 337.
106 See 11 U.S.C. § 348(t)(2) (directing that in the case of bad faith property
of the estate in the converted case is determined as of the date of conversion).
101 11 U.S.C. § 348(t)(l)(A).
10s See supra note 81.
109 That fact, of course, was dispositive for the court in In re Castleman,
631 B.R. 914, 919 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2021). See also supra notes 3S-50 and
accompanying text.
no 11 U.S.C. § 348(t)(l)(B) (1994).
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are only binding in conversions from Chapters 11 and 12, and
not Chapter 13. 111 This change precipitated the argument from
Chapter 7 trustees that the 2005 Act not only did away with any
notion of implicit valuation as a result of confirmation of the plan
in a Chapter 13 case, 112 but, because section 348(f)(1)(B) now expressly provides that valuations from Chapter 13 do not carry over
into converted Chapter 7 cases, it also reflected Congress's intent
that postpetition, pre-conversion appreciation becomes property
of the estate in the converted case.1 13 However, even among cases
that ultimately find in favor of the trustee, 114 the argument that
m See Pub. L. No. 109·8, § 309(a)(2), 119 Stat. 82 (2005). Debtors in Chapters 11 and 12 retain their property, as is the case for Chapter 13 debtors. 11
U.S. C. § 1306(b). The 2005 Act (§ 309(a)(3)) also added a new subparagraph
(C) to section 348(t)(1). Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 309(a)(3). The intention behind the
amendment to subparagraph (B) and the addition of new subparagraph (C)
was to eliminate the "strip down and convert" practice under which the debtor would write down an undersecured claim to the value of the collateral in
his or her Chapter 13 plan as permitted by section 1325(a)(5)(B), pay off that
amount during the plan, and then convert to Chapter 7. See In re McGregor,
449 B.R. 468, 471 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2011). The effect would be that, with the lien
paid off, the debtor would enjoy the property, if exempt, free and clear. Id. Subparagraph (C) provides that (1) in the event of conversion from Chapter 13, a
secured creditor's claim will remain secured by its collateral if less than the
full amount of the debt has been paid, and (2) any pre-filing default under
applicable non-bankruptcy law will be deemed to be in effect unless that default was fully cured prior to conversion. See id. at 472 (explaining the operation of the provision). Cf. 11 U.S. C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(l), also added by BAPCPA,
which provides that the lien securing a claim shall be retained until payment
in full or entry of discharge under section 1328(a).
112 See supra note 111.
113 Prior to the 2005 Act's amendment to section 348(t)(1)(B), several courts
held that the order confirming a Chapter 13 plan incorporates an implicit finding
that the value of the debtor's residence is the value at which the debtor scheduled
the residence. See In re Goins, 539 B.R. 510, 513 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2015); see
also infra note 137 and accompanying text. But see In re Lynch, 363 B.R. 101,
106 (B.AP. 9th Cir. 2007) (finding the implicit valuation approach to be inlprudent because debtors are motivated to list the values of assets in their schedules no higher than to satisfy the requirements of good faith and creditors
lack the incentive to challenge valuations); In re Jackson, 317 B.R. 511, 513
(Bankr. N.D. ill. 2004) (stating that "the bankruptcy court can simply hold a
valuation hearing at or near the time of a proposed sale in the chapter 7 to
determine what the real property was worth when the chapter 13 petition was
originally filed'}
114 See, e.g., In re Castleman, 631 B.R. 914, 921 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2021);
In re Goins, 539 B.R. at 516.
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the 2005 Act's amendment to subparagraph (B) resolved entitlement to postpetition, pre-conversion appreciation in favor of
the estate has largely been discounted.115 As the court explained
in In re Lang, 116 rejection of use of Chapter 13 valuations did not
mean rejection of value established in the Chapter 13 cases because the two concepts refer to different things.l17 Thus, the court
in Lang concluded that the valuation provision in subparagraph
(B) has no bearing on the interpretation of subparagraph (A).UB
Clearly, the adoption of section 348(f)(1), both before and
after the 2005 Act, did not resolve all of the questions concerning
what property would be included in the Chapter 7 estate upon
conversion from Chapter 13.119 Moreover, just as there has been
division over who enjoys the benefit of increases in the value of
property between filing and conversion, 120 there has been a split
in the case law along the same lines over exemptions.121 Specifically, the issue is whether the exemptions the debtor can claim
(as well as the value of any such exemptions) are frozen as of the
date the bankruptcy petition was flied, 122 or whether the debtor
is permitted to claim and value exemptions as of the time of
In re Castleman, 631 B.R. at 920; In re Goins, 539 B.R. at 515 (agreeing
that the trustee was entitled to postpetition appreciation in property, but not
because the 2005 Act amendment to section 348(f)(1)(B) legislatively overruled the implicit valuation authorities); see also supra note 42. As earlier
observed, these courts find for the trustee based on the plain language of the
statute and section 541(a)(6). See supra text accompanying notes 48-52.
11s 437 B.R. 70, 73 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2010).
117 Id. at 72-73 (explaining that "valuation," meaning the process for determining value, does not constitute the ''value" that the debtor is obligated
to turnover to the trustee). Thus, the court concluded that the debtor's obligation under section 542(a) is to turnover to the trustee any property of the
estate in the debtor's possession upon the trustee's appointment of the trustee. Id. at 73. In that case, this meant the debtor was not responsible to make
up any post-filing, pre-conversion depreciation in property. Id.; see also supra
text accompanying note 55.
11s In re Lang, 427 B.R. at 72.
119 Id. at 73.
12o See supra Part I. This includes the disagreement over entitlement to
increases derived from dllferent circumstances. See supra Section I. C.
121 Compare In re Cofer, 625 B.R. 194, 199 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2021), with In
re Wegner, 243 B.R. 731, 736 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2000).
122 See, e.g., In re Cofer, 625 B.R. at 199 (adopting what the court termed
the "snapshot" rule, under which the exemptions that a debtor can claim (and
the amounts thereof) are frozen as of the date of bankruptcy petition was filed
eligible cause single).
115
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conversion_123 Logically, the dates selected for determination of
property of the estate and exemptions should coincide, but the
statute itself is silent.124
In addition to the questions regarding the timing for property
valuation and exemptions, section 348(f) also fails to answer another
issue that had completely bedeviled the courts for decades; to wit,
who gets the benefit of funds collected by the trustee before, but
not distributed prior to, conversion? 125 Mercifully, in 2015, the
Supreme Court finally stepped in to resolve the matter.1 26 In an
unanimous opinion, the Court concluded that, even though section 548(£) did not address the issue explicitly, the structure and
ratiocination for that provision left no doubt that the undistributed funds should inure to the benefit of the debtor_127
In additional support of its holding that a Chapter 7 debtor's
postpetition earnings still in possession of the Chapter 13 trustee should not be turned over to creditors under the terms of the
prior Chapter 13 plan, Justice Ginsberg's opinion pointed to the
core policy animating Chapter 7 of enabling "the 'honest but unfortunate debtor' to make the 'fresh start' the Bankruptcy Code
aims to facilitate." 128 That reasoning has particular resonance
for resolving the question concerning entitlement to an increase
12a See, e.g., In re Wegner, 243 B.R. at 736 (urging that because the purposes and consequences of exemptions are so different in Chapter 13 as compared
to Chapter 7, "a debtor should be permitted to claim exemptions based on circumstances whiclt exist at the time of conversion from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7").
12• Id. at 735.
125 One line of authority reasoned that, with little guidance from the Code,
"considerations of equity and policy" dictated that the undistributed funds
should go to payment of creditor claims. In re Harris, 757 F. 3d 468, 478 (5th
Cir. 2014). Other courts, such as In re Michael, found that undistributed funds
from the debtor's wages should be returned to the debtor at the time of conversion from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7. 699 F.3d 305, 313--14 (3d Cir. 2012).
12s Harris v. Viegelahn, 575 U.S. 510, 518 (2015).
127 Id. ("By excluding postpetition wages from the converted Chapter 7 estate, § 348(f)(1)(A) removes those earnings from the pool of assets that may
be liquidated and distributed to creditors. Allowing a terminated Chapter 13
trustee to disburse the very same earnings to the very same creditors is incompatible with that statutory design. We resist attributing to Congress, after
explicitly exempting from Chapter 7's liquidation-and·distribution process a
debtor's postpetition wages, a plan to place those wages in creditors' hands
another way.'}
12a Id. at 518--19 (quoting Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S.
365, 367 (2007)).
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in nonexempt value of the debtor's property during the course of
the Chapter 13 case_129 However, as will be seen in the section
following immediately below, it falls short of definitively making
the case that such appreciation should, without the opportunity
for further scrutiny, remain with the debtor_130
Ill. ANALYSIS OF THE Two VIEWS

Any cogent analysis in this area must start with the basic
differences between Chapters 7 and 13, as these differences account for the complexities arising upon conversion in the first
place.13 1 Chapter 7 essentially entails the surrender by the debtor
of his or her nonexempt assets in return for a discharge from
most prepetition debts.132 While the property of the estate subject to
liquidation by the trustee is defined broadly in section 541(a)(1),
of particular importance, it does not include either wages or assets acquired by the debtor after the petition has been filed.1 33
Conversely, Chapter 13 works just the opposite.1 34 Instead
of an exchange of prepetition property in return for a discharge,
in Chapter 13 the debtor retains her property and proposes a threeto five-year plan for repayment of all or some portion of the
debtor's pre-filing obligations out of future income_135 Discharge
does not occur, if it does at all, until completion of all payments
under the plan_136 Critically, therefore, the Chapter 13 estate from
which creditors are to be paid includes both the debtor's property
at the time of his bankruptcy petition, and any wages and property acquired after the filing_137
See infra notes 168--70 and accompanying text.
See infra text accompanying notes 167-72; see also Harris, 575 U.S. at 518.
181 See infra notes 171-74 and accompanying text.
132 See David Gray Carlson, Modified Plans of Reorganization and the Basic
Chapter 13 Bargain, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 585, 587--88 (2009).
133 11 U.S.C. §§ 541(a)(1), (6).
134 See Carlson, supra note 132, at 587-88 (explaining the basic difference
between the bargain the debtor makes with her creditors under Chapter 13
as compared with Chapter 7).
185 See 11 U.S. C. § 1322(d)(1). For above-median income debtors, based on
location and family size, the plan must extend for the full five years unless creditors are paid in full earlier than that. Id.
186 Id. § 1328(a). A rare exception exists for a ''hardship discharge." Id.
§ 1328(b).
187 See id. § 1306(a).
129

130
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From the perspective of a secured party, and in particular
a home loan mortgagee, there is no compelling fmancial reason
to contest the debtor's valuation of her residence, as a mortgage
secured by the debtor's principal residence, along with certain
other loans, must be paid in full in Chapter 13 even if the value
of the collateral is less than the principal balance of the loan.1as
By contrast, in Chapter 7, section 506(a)(1) is given full force and
effect, such that a claim, including a clainl secured by debtor's principal residence, is allowed as a secured claim only to the extent
of the value of the collateral.1 39 This means that it is in the interests of most secured creditors to examine scheduled values
much more carefully in Chapter 7 than Chapter 13, and for the
Chapter 7 case trustee to evaluate the debtor's assertions of value,
including in the home residence, in order to determine if any
equity exists in the property for general creditors over and above
the sum of the secured claim(s) and the applicable homestead or
other exemption_140
Consider, once more, the facts of In re Castleman.1 41 The
debtors were entitled to a homestead exemption of up to $125,000
and the amount outstanding on their home mortgage loan was
$375,077.1 42 The debtors valued their home at $500,000, curiously
'"" A Chapter 13 debtor is prohibited from modifying the rights of claims
secured solely by debtor's residence. See id. § 1322(b)(2); Nobelman v. Am. Sav.
Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 332 (1993). Thus, the mortgagee is protected from bifurcation under section 506(a)(1) even if the debtor understates the value of her
home. See id. at 328--29; see also supra note 113. In addition, since the 2005 Act,
most consumer car loans may no longer be bifurcated under section 506(a)(1),
although they may otherwise be modified. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(*) (known
as the "hanging paragraph''). See generally Juliet M. Moringiello, (Mis)Use of
State Law in Bankruptcy: The Hanging Paragraph Story, 2012 WIS. L. REV.
963 (2012). Thus, the two most common secured creditors in consumer bankruptcy cases, the home and car finance, get paid in full. Id. at 968 n.14. Thus,
they have tepid motivation at best to challenge the debtor's scheduled value
of their collateral. See In re Lynch, 363 B.R. 101, 106 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007).
139 See In re Wegner, 243 B.R. 731, 736 (Ban.kr. D. Neb. 2000). Similarly,
other parties in Chapter 13 also lack the same motivation as would exist in
Chapter 7 to challenge exemption claims. See In re Lynch, 363 B.R. at 106.
140 The court in In re Wegner, made the same point in relation to challenging exemption claims, noting the significantly different role exemptions play
in comparison with a Chapter 13 case and Chapter 7 case. Once more, this is
particularly so with regard to the homestead exemption.
141 In re Castleman, 631 B.R. 914, 914-15 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. June 24, 2021).
142 Id. at 916.
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just shy of the sum of the debt and the exemption cap.143 Upon
conversion, some roughly thirty·two months later, the trustee
asserted that the property had a value of $700,000.1 44 According
to the court, it was not clear what had contributed to the forty per·
cent increase in value in such a relatively short period of time, or
whether there was no such increase and the trustee believed the
originally scheduled value was understated in the first place.1 45
The conclusion in Castleman and other cases that, under
the plain language of section 348(f)(1), the increase in value, what·
ever its cause, 146 becomes part of the Chapter 7 estate is hard to
justify from any principled policy orientation.1 47 The holding advances neither the congressional bias in favor of Chapter 13 over
Chapter 7, nor the fresh start policy so fundamental in Chapter 7.1 48
Moreover, while it is true, as the Castleman court pointed out,149
that the language of the statute makes no distinction between
equity build·up through debt reduction and market factors, it is
also the case that the language does not, in the first instance, resolve either way the question of entitlement to net increases
over and above the amount of the debtor's equity at the time of the
filing of the Chapter 13 petitionJ5D Moreover, section 541(a)(6) is
not unambiguous either as its exclusion of postpetition earnings
and property from the estate clashes with section 1306(a),151 and,
under section 348(a), conversion does not change the date of the
order for relief.152
Id.
Id.
145 Id. at 916 n.l.
146 See supra Section I.A.
147 See supra Section I.A.
14B Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling, 138 S. Ct. 1752, 1758 (2018)
("One of the 'main purposes' of the federal bankruptcy system is 'to aid the
unfortunate debtor by giving him a fresh start in life."'); Harris v. Viegelahn,
575 U.S. 510, 518-19 (2015) ("Shielding a Chapter 7 debtor's postpetition earn·
ings from creditors enables the 'honest but unfortunate debtor' to make the
'fresh start' the Bankruptcy Code aims to facilitate.").
149 In re Castleman, 631 B.R. at 920 n.4.
100 See id. at 916.
151 Section 1306(a)(2) includes postpetition earnings in the Chapter 13 estate.
152 See supra note 93. A similar conflict exists between sections 1306 and
1327 over what is property of the estate after confirmation. See In re Larzelere,
No. 17·34411·ABA, 2021 WL 3745428, *2--6 (Bankr. D. N.J. Aug. 24, 2021) (dis·
cussing the split between the "estate replenishment" approach and the "estate
preservation'' theory).
14s
144
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Section 348(f) is not a model of clarity to say the least and
its architecture is unusual.153 Subparagraph (A) applies to cases
converted from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 and defines the property
of the Chapter 7 estate essentially to exclude property acquired
postpetition, presuming the conversion was not undertaken in
bad faith.1 54 It says nothing about valuation.1 55 However, it is
entirely plausible to read section 348(f)(1)(A) to mean ''property
as it existed on the petition date, with all its attributes, including
the amount of equity that existed on that date,"l56 and it is more
consistent with applicable policy aims to do so_157 In other words,
the plain meaning is really not quite as "plain" as the court in
Castleman found it to be_158
Subparagraph (B) does speak to valuation and specifies
that valuations of property (and of allowed secured claims) in
the Chapter 13 case shall apply only in cases converted to Chapter 11 or 12, ''but not in a case converted to a case under chapter
7." 159 It is certainly possible to draw the negative inference that
if Chapter 13 valuations are not applicable in a case later converted to Chapter 7, then the value as of the date of conversion
should control.1 60 If true, this would conflict with the interpretation of subparagraph (A) suggested above. However, as just observed,l61 there appears to be a consensus that subparagraph
(B) has no bearing on the question of value.l62 As the court in In
re Castleman (a case favoring using the date of conversion for determining value) explained in response to the trustee's argument
that the 2005 Act clarified that any postpetition, pre-conversion
See 11 U.S.C. § 348(f).
Id. § 348(f)(l)(A).
See id.
156 See In re Cofer, 625 B.R. 194, 200 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2021); see also supra
notes 72--79 and accompanying text.
157 See supra notes 72--79 and accompanying text.
158 Recall the discussion of ''latent ambiguity" of what might, in isolation,
appear to be clear text. In re Barrera, 620 B.R. 645, 654 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2020),
affd, No. BAP C0-20-003, 2020 WL 5869458 (lOth Cir. BAP (Colo.) Oct. 2, 2020),
aff'd, 22 F.4th 1217 (lOth Cir. 2022); see supra note 61.
159 11 U.S.C. § 348(f)(l)(B). The amendment, it would seem, concerned another issue entirely. See infra text accompanying note 218.
1so See infra text accompanying note 218.
161 See supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
162 In re Castleman, 631 B.R. 914, 920 n.5 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. June 24, 2021).
153
154
155
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appreciation is included in the Chapter 7 estate: "[A]s one court
correctly noted, valuation does not mean value and the valuation
provision in section 348(f)(1)(B) was irrelevant to interpretation
of section 348(f)(1)(A) even prior to the 2005 amendment." 163
Furthermore, under subsection (f)(2), the rules in both subsections (f)(1)(A) and (B) do not apply if the case was converted
to any other chapter in bad faith, in which circumstance the
property of the Chapter 7 estate is determined as of the date of
conversion_164 A logical inference that may be derived from that
provision is that, in a good faith conversion scenario, increases
in value occurring after the Chapter 13 filing and prior to conversion should be excluded from the property of the estate in the
ensuing Chapter 7 case_165 This is in accord with subparagraph
(B) in Chapter 11 and 12 cases, but subsection (f)(2) is not limited to conversions to Chapter 11 or 12, suggesting an additional
conflict between subparagraph (B) and subsection (f)(2) insofar
as time of valuation is concerned.1 66 The inescapable conclusion
is that although the statute, as drafted, may be characterized as
unambiguous if read in isolation, as this discussion highlights,
section 348(f)(1)(A) can also, without one's tongue planted firmly
in one's cheek, be read in a Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 conversion
situation to support using value at either point in time_167
That being the case, under the articulated legislative intent in enacting section 348(f)(l)(A),168 as well as the policy considerations articulated in Harris v. Viegelahn, 169 a strong case
can be made that an increase in the debtor's equity, whether due
Id. (citing In re Lang, 437 B.R. 70, 72-73 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2010)).
See 11 U.S.C. § 348(±)(2).
165 In re Cofer, 625 B.R. 194, 202 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2021).
166 See generally CHARLES J. TABB, LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 2.22, 227 (5th
ed. 2020).
167 See supra Part Ill.
168 See supra text accompanying notes 65-66. A£. expressed in one of the
decisions that ultimately was codified in section 348(f)(1)(A): "If debtors must
take the risk that property acquired during the course of an attempt at repayment will have to be liquidated for the benefit of creditors if chapter 13 proves
unavailing, the incentive to give chapter 13--which must be voluntary-a try
will be greatly diminished." In re Bobroff, 766 F.2d 797, 803 (3d Cir. 1985).
169 575 U.S. 510, 510 (2015) (relying on the fresh start policy in Chapter 7
to resolve a question left unaddressed by section 348(±)(1)); see supra notes
123-27 and accompanying text.
163
164
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to payments on the mortgage or market factors, should stay with
the debtor_170 But here's the rub. The original asset values stated
in the debtor's schedules are difficult to trust because they were
not exposed to the same level of scrutiny that they would receive
in a Chapter 7 case.1 71 That is to say, as detailed above, 172 there
is simply less cause or reason for the Chapter 13 trustee, secured
claimants, or even unsecured creditors to question the accuracy
of the scheduled amounts.173 In effect, it does not matter to any
serious degree, unless and until, of course, the case is converted.174
The almost identical (and rather suspicious) coincidence in Castleman between with the sum of the secured debt as of the date
of filing and the homestead exemption limit, on the one hand, and
the value of the property as scheduled, on the other, lends ere·
dence to those who might express skepticism over blindly accepting the debtor's scheduled values without an opportunity to
reexamine values upon a change of circumstances, 175 albeit still
measured as of the time of the petition filing.
Hence, we end up with a rule that either operates beyond
what, it can quite credibly be claimed, is the clear wording of the
statutory text of section 348(t)(1)(A),176 or one that contravenes
the legislative history, 177 the congressional policies of encouraging
Chapter 13 over Chapter 7,178 as well as maximizing the debtor's
chances for a fresh start as recognized by the Supreme Court in
deciding the other unresolved question under section 348(t)(1).179
See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
112 See supra text accompanying notes 137-39.
173 See, e.g., Kendall v. Lynch (In re Lynch), 363 B.R. 101, 106 (B.A.P. 9th
Cir. 2007) (describing different motivations in relation to valuation in Chapter 13
and Chapter 7).
174 See id. at 103-04, 107 (implying that this issue only becomes relevant
in a situation where conversion occurs).
175 See In re Castleman, 631 B.R. 914, 916 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. June 24, 2021).
The court suggested that it was unclear if the trustee was questioning the
original valuation. Id. at 916 n.l.
176 Id. at 919 (stating that, "[w]here, as here, the statute is clear and con·
sistent with overall legislative intent, the failure to in any manner address
the example provided in the legislative history does not create ambiguity").
177 See supra note 81.
178 See supra notes 4 and 148.
179 See Harris v. Viegelahn, 575 U.S. 510, 513 (2015); see also supra notes
125-27 and accompanying text.
110

171
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Neither view is specious or without some foundation.lBO It is the
existence of this Hobbesian Choice that leads me to the conclusion
that both of the judicial approaches are correct, which, of course,
cannot be so.181 Thus, it may be most accurate to say they are
each at least tenable insofar as reaching a defensible result is
concerned, and there is no satisfactory and unequivocal basis for
selecting one over the other under the law as currently embodied
in the Code.182 The problem, of course, stems from the inadequacy
of section 348(f)(l) in the first instance, which, in a different context, one court described as producing "unreasonable or absurd"
results when literally applied_l83

N. A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION
Obviously, it is conceivable that this disruptive disagreement
in the case law might eventually be resolved without legislative
intervention.1 84 However, given the tangle of related justifications
relating to the allocation of increases in value attributable to
different causes, 185 this would entail either unanimous consensus in the circuit courts of appeal or resolution by the Supreme
Court. But, in addition to being impracticable in terms of both inordinate delay and cost,186 we are still left with two options that
See In re Castleman, 631 B.R. at 918-20; Harris, 575 U.S. at 518-20.
See In re Castleman, 631 B.R. at 921; Harris, 575 U.S. at 518-19.
182 Rather, it is a question of whether one takes a textualist or purposive
approach to statutory interpretation, a matter on which universal agreement
is very unlikely to ever occur. For discussion of the two theories of statutory
interpretation and analysis, see Anita S. Krishnakumar, Backdoor Purposivism,
DUKE L.J. 1275, 1343-44 (2020).
183 Pagano v. Pergament, No. 11-CV-2630 (SJF), 2012 WL 1828854, at *4
(E.D.N.Y. May 16, 2012) (involving an unlawful disposal of assets and citing
Wyss v. Fobber (In re Fobber), 256 B.R. 268, 279 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2000));
see also infra text accompanying notes 191-97.
184 See Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 13-14 (2006).
185 See supra Part I.
188 By and large, debtors who have been living on a meager budget for some
period of time in order to make payments under a Chapter 13 plan and have
now had to convert the case to straight bankruptcy are hardly in a position to
fund appeals over what are often relatively non-substantial amounts of money.
See Kerry Haydel Ducey, Bankruptcy, Just for the Rich? An Analysis of Popular
Fee Arrangements for Pre-petition Legal Fees and A Call to Amend, 54 VAND.
L. REV. 1665, 1666-69 (2001). It is worth noting that it took over 30 years to get
1ao
181
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are near-equally tenable, but simultaneously each flawed in a
way that does not fairly advance core principles in bankruptcy
law and policy.1 87 On the one hand, the explicit text of section
348(f)(1)(A), at least when disjoined from subsection (f)(2), does
make a creditable case for the value as of the date of conversion
approach, or what we might dub the "Castleman view." 188 It also
is in harmony with section 541(a)(6), 189 and coheres quite nicely
with the Supreme Court emphasis in recent decades on a plain
meaning jurisprudence in deciding bankruptcy cases.190
The not inconsiderable problem is that it does clash rather
harshly with the policy of promoting Chapter 13 over Chapter 7
as well as the basic fresh start instincts that animate the Code_l91
Moreover, it is not rock solid insofar as statutory interpretation
is concerned. Recently, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Kansas was faced with the issue of whether, in connection with confirmation of an amended plan, 192 property acquired
postpetition should be included in the determination of whether
the best interests test of section 1325(a)(4) is satisfied,193 The debtor
the issue of who is entitled to undistributed funds upon conversion from Chapter
13 to Chapter 7 in front of the Supreme Court. See supra text accompanying
notes 125--27.
187 See supra notes 180--81 and accompanying text. One might predict the
Castleman view to prevail were tlte question ever to reach the Supreme Court.
See Daniel J. Busse!, Textualism's Failures: A Study of Overruled Bankruptcy
Cases, 53 VAND. L. REV. 887, 900 (2000).
188 See In re Castleman, 631 B.R. 914, 920--21 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2021).
189 See In re Potter, 228 B.R. 422, 424 (B.AP. 8tlt Cir. 1999). The conflict
with the proviso excluding postpetition wages has been explained on the basis
that a change in the value of an asset does not fall witltin tlte purview of
"earnings from services performed by an individual debtor." Id.
190 See Busse!, supra note 187, at 900 (noting that "[t]he Supreme Court
has chosen to make the Bankruptcy Code a kind of proving ground for textualist interpretation, regularly adopting textualist interpretations to settle the
law on contested questions arising under the Bankruptcy Code."). On the Court's
slide into textualism more generally, see James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum,
Oasis or Mirage: The Supreme Court's Thirst for Dictionaries in the Rehnquist
and Roberts Eras, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 483, 486--87 (2013) and Molot, supra
note 184, at 35--36 (''[W]e have all become textualists.").
191 See Harris v. Viegelalm, 575 U.S. 510, 513-14 (2015).
192 11 U.S.C. section 1329(a) provides for post-confirmation of a Chapter
13 plan upon motion of the debtor, tlte trustee, or an unsecured creditor.
193 In re Taylor, 631 B.R. 346, 353 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2021). The issue arose
as a consequence of tlte debtor's receipt of a settlement on a personal injury
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did not contest that the property in question was property of the
estate under section 1306(a) and section 541(a)(6).194 Rather, the
debtor contended that the value, as of the effective date of the plan,
that must be distributed to unsecured creditors under section
1325(a)(4) is the value as of the effective date of the original plan
and not value as of date of the modified plan_195 Acknowledging
yet another split in the case law,196 the court sided with the view
holding that the value as of the "effective date of the plan" for
purposes of section 1325(a)(4) is the value on confirmation of the
amended plan, not the value as of the original Chapter 13 filing.197
What is of particular consequence for present purposes,
however, is the Taylor court's further determination that its fmding in relation to "the effective date of the plan" did not mean
that the trustee's motion to use the date of the modified plan must
be granted.19B Instead, the court turned to section 348(f) and concluded that it controls the property to be included in the hypothetical liquidation rather than section 1306(a).199 Because the
property at issue would not have been part of the Chapter 7 estate if the case had been converted, the court concluded that the
hypothetical liquidation required under the best interest test should
be conducted assuming the same estate.2oo
In justifying this resolution of the conflict between sections 1306(a) and 348(f), the court applied the orthodox principle
of statutory interpretation that the more specific statute defining
claim arising after confirmation of her Chapter 13 plan. Id. at 347. The Chap·
ter 13 Trustee moved to modify under section 1329(a) to use a portion of those
proceeds to increase payments to unsecured creditors. Id.
194 Id. at 348.
195 Id. at 351-53. Actually, the opinion only states that the debtor opposed
the trustee's motion on several grounds without detailing them. Id. at 349.
However, one presumes this was one of the arguments as it is discussed ex·
tensively in the opinion. Id. at 351-53.
195 Id. at 352.
197 Id. at 350 (following the reasoning of the court in In re Barbosa, 235
B.R. 540, 552 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1999), affd, Barbosa v. Solomon, 243 B.R. 562
(D. Mass. 2000), affd, 235 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2000)).
19B Id. at 353.
199 Id.
2oo ld. at 354 (citing KEITH M LUNDIN, LUNDIN ON CHAPTER 13 § 122.2, at
12) (acknowledging that while exclusion of such windfall property may produce harsh results for creditors, '"[n]o prepetition creditor has any (reasona·
hie) expectation of payment from such property' and exclusion of the windfall
promotes the fresh start policy'').
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property of the estate upon conversion controls over the more
general provision.2Dl By the same logic, where the asset was not
acquired post-filing but its value has increased pre-conversion,
section 348(f)(1)(A)'s reference "property of the estate, as of the
date of filing of the petition'' might be seen as overriding the more
general command in section 541(a)(6) as to what postpetition
property becomes part of the estate.2o2 The use of this maxim of
statutory interpretation would also provide a resolution to what
the court in In re Goins referred to as the "irreconcilable conflict''
between section 541(a)(6) and the cases that awarded postpetition appreciation to the debtor.2oa Without question, the analogy
is not, like most everything else in this area, free from doubt,
and it undoubtedly hinges on reading subparagraph (A) as referring not only to property in existence on the petition day, but
also to property as it existed on the petition date.2D4
The rationale for doing just that is that the "date of filing''
approach to value, or what we might refer to as the "Barrera
view," is undoubtedly far more compatible with the rather clear
indications of legislative purpose surrounding section 348(f), particularly as to increases in net value as a result of payments on
debt secured by the property at issue.2D5 It also implements relevant bankruptcy principles in a fashion that provides for far
more consistent application of the foundational goals in consumer
cases, including fresh start for debtors and value maximization
for creditors. 206 For instance, it is settled law since the 1994
amendments that post-filing property acquisitions stay with the
Id. at 353.
Compare 11 U.S.C. § 348(±)(1), with 11 U.S.C. § 54l(a)(6).
2oa In re Goins, 539 B.R. 510, 516 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2015).
204 This, of course, is exactly the reading the court adopted in In re Barrera,
620 B.R. 645, 653 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2020), affd, No. BAP C0-20-003, 2020 WL
5869458 (lOth Cir. BAP (Colo.) Oct. 2, 2020), affd, 22 F.4th 1217 (lOth Cir. 2022).
2o5 Id. This is due to the fact that, unlike market appreciation, it entails allocation of postpetition wages or property to the secured debt in contravention of section 54l(a)(6). Id.
206 See In re DeNadai, 259 B.R. 801, 806 (Bankr. D. Mass.), affd sub nom.
DeNadai v. Preferred Cap. Mkts., Inc., 272 B.R. 21 (D. Mass. 2001). At first
blush, awarding postpetition, pre conversion appreciation to the debtor may seem
to be at cross purposes with value maximization for creditors. See supra note 25.
However, if it is part of an overall strategy to incentivize debtors to opt for
repayment under Chapter 13 over liquidation under Chapter 7, then, in fact, the
two are perfectly consistent. See supra notes 23--26 and accompanying text.
2o1
202
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debtor, absent bad faith, under the explicit language of section
348(f)(1)(A).207 That being true, what, as a matter of substance, is
the difference between value attributable to newly acquired property and value arising from market appreciation or due to debt
reduction? Indeed, what if the newly acquired property is acquired
with proceeds of property that was in the debtor's possession as
of the time of the Chapter 13 filing but now, as a result, no longer
becomes property of the Chapter 7 estate under section 348(f)(1)(A)?
Alternatively, increased value may be caused by renovations to the
property paid for by a debtor from postpetition earnings. Why
should increases in equity resulting from any one source be treated
any differently from equity resulting from a debtor's payments of a
mortgage when the same policy considerations are implicated?
To draw these meaningless distinctions, as well as ignore
patently clear statements of legislative purpose, is shortsighted
in the view of this Article. Nonetheless, the Castleman interpretation persists because the statute itself offers no guidance.2os
Moreover the approach in that case is not without some justification given the currency and prowess of the textualist approach
to determining legislative intent,209 and its core belief that legislative supremacy can best be achieved when judges prioritize the
actual words that Congress used--even when those words seem
to contradict explicit and unequivocal pronouncements of legislative purpose.21o As the court in Castleman itself observed,2n its
holding concerning pre-conversion increases in value also coheres
with Ninth Circuit precedent in relation to the treatment of postpetition appreciation of assets under section 541(a)(6), even as,
at the same time, it clashes with the closing language of that statutory provision.212 Finally, it can be argued that the Castleman
view promotes judicial economy by relieving the necessity for
creditors or the Chapter 13 trustee to force what might be needless
valuation hearings just as a hedge against the possibility that the
See supra notes 102-07 and accompanying text.
See In re Castleman, 631 B.R. 914, 919-20 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2021).
200 See supra note 190.
21o See, e.g., John F. Mamring, Legal Realism & the Canons' Revival, 5 GREEN
BAG 2d 283, 290 (2002); Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of
Textualism, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 117, 154 (describing the fundamental textualist
axiom that statutory text is the law even if it conflicts with purposive intent).
211 In re Castleman, 631 B.R. at 920.
212 See supra note 52.
207
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debtor later decides or needs to exercise his or her unqualified
right to convert to Chapter 7.213
For these reasons, an amendment to the statute is the only
sensible alternative to continued, and perhaps perpetual, disagreement and disuniformity over the matter. But what does that
revised statute look like? Ideally, it would implement the clear
legislative intent behind the existing statute to avoid imposing
serious disincentives to f:tling Chapter 13, 214 as well as the reasoning in Harris v. Viegelahn that was quite consistent therewith.215 Yet, at the same time, it must address the concern that
scheduled valuations, and particularly auto and homestead valuations,216 must be fairly adjudicated, or at least provide the opportunity to do so after conversion exists.217
The proposal offered for accomplishing these goals takes
the form of the following "red-lined'' version of the current statute.
(f)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), when a case under
chapter 13 of this title is converted to a case under another
chapter under this title-(A) property of the estate in the converted case shall consist of
property of the estate, as of the date of filing of tile petition,
that remains in the possession of or is under the control of the
debtor on the date of conversion;

In re Castleman, 631 B.R. at 919-21.
See supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
575 U.S. 510, 518-19 (2015); see also supra notes 123-27 and accompanyingtext.
216 See supra note 137 and accompanying text regarding the impact of the
non-modification rule witll respect to property serving as the debtor's principal residence. See also Kendall v. Lynch (In re Lynch), 363 B.R. 101, 106-07
(B.A.P. 9t11 Cir. 2007).
217 The same point can be made with respect to scheduled exemptions in
the Chapter 13 case. Exemptions serve a very different purpose in Chapter 13
than Chapter 7. In re Wegner, 243 B.R. 731, 736 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2000). Because
the Chapter 13 debtor does not surrender her property, tile only purpose of
listing exempt property in a Chapter 13 case is to permit creditors and the
Chapter 13 trustee to analyze whether the proposed Chapter 13 plan satisfies
the best interest test in section 1325(a)(4). 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (2018); In re
Wegner, 243 B.R. at 736. Thus, just as with the debtor's valuations, tile trustee in tile converted Chapter 7 case should have the opportunity to challenge
the debtor's entitlement to specific exemptions in the claimed amount. See id.
at 736 (discussing the very different roles, and allied motivations tllat exist
as a consequence, that exemptions serve in Chapters 7 and 13).
213
214
215

2022] ALLOCATION OF PROPERTY APPRECIATION

757

(ii) valuation of property remaining in the debtor's possession
or under the debtor's control for purposes of the converted
case shall be made as of the date of the filing of the petition:
(iii) determination of the debtor's exemptions and valuation of
exempt property for purposes of the converted case shall be
made as of the date filing of the petition: and
(B) valuations of allowed secured claims in the chapter 13 case
shall apply in a case the converted to another chapter, in a ease
eaw;e!'ted ta ease undeF chapter 11 ar 12, hut nat in a ease
eaw.'Cl'ted ta a ease under ehapter 7, with allawed seeured
elaims in eases under ehapters 11 and 12 redueed ta the Ell<
tent that they hw;e heen paid in aeeardanee with the ehapter 13
plan; subject to reduction to extent of any payments, regardless of course, received on account of such claims between the
date of the filing of the petition and the date of conversion.:
(C) For purposes of subparagraph (A), unless an explicit valuation was undertaken in the chapter 13 proceeding, the trustee
in a case converted to chapter 7 may object to the valuations
of propertv and exemptions used for purposes of confirmation
of the debtor's plan, and the court, after notice and a hearing,
shall determine such values:
(D) Notwithstanding subparagraph (B), with respect cases
converted from chapter 13 to chapter 7(i) the claim of any creditor holding security as of the date of
the filing of the petition shall continue to be secured by that
security unless the full amount of such claim determined un ·
der applicable nonbankruptcy law has been paid in full as of
the date of conversion, notwithstanding any valuation or determination of the amount of an allowed secured claim made
for the purposes of the case under chapter 13; and
(ii) unless a prebankruptcy default has been fully cured under
the plan at the time of conversion, in any proceeding under
this title or otherwise, the default shall have the effect given
under applicable nonbankruptcy law.]
(2) If the debtor converts a case under chapter 13 of this title
to a case under another chapter under this title in bad faith,
the property of the estate in the converted case shall consist
of the property of the estate as of the date of conversion. 218
218 11 U.S.C. § 348(f) (2018). Note that the introductory language to pro·
posed section 348(f)(1)(D) is modified so that it only applies to conversions
from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7. The intention is to eliminate the conflict in the
statute as is between section 348(f)(1)(B), which was not amended by the 2005
Act in cases involving conversion from Chapter 13 to Chapter 11 or 12, and
section 348(f)(1)(C), which currently covers all cases converted from Chapter 13.
This would leave the "strip down and convert'' tactic available in those cases.
See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
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V.

RATIONALE FOR THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT

A. Incentivizing Chapter 13 and Promoting Fresh Start
A central premise of the revised section 348(f) is that the
debtor should not be penalized-not be made worse off-for having given Chapter 13 a go. Thus, any increase in the net value of
property of the estate as of the date of filing would not become
property of the estate in the converted case.219 Rather, it would
inure to the debtor and be available to facilitate the debtor's fresh
start, including satisfaction of obligations owing to postpetition
creditors, in the same manner as would have occurred had the
debtor originally filed Chapter 7 instead of 13.220 Likewise any
payments on account of a secured claim would reduce that claim
in the converted without regard to the source of the payment.221
The objection to this rationale: namely, that it gives the
debtor a windfall with respect to increases in value due purely to
market factors, was raised by the trustee in In re Barrera. 222
However, the court made short work of that contention, pointing
out that
in a case converted from chapter 13 to chapter 7, it would violate these general principles [those regarding incentivizing Chap·
ter 13 by assuring the debtor is no worse off than the debtor
would have been had the debtor filed Chapter 13 at the onset]
if the chapter 7 trustee were to reap the benefit of both the

Harris, 575 U.S. at 517-18.
This is consistent with the rationale for the Supreme Court's decision
in Harris, to award undistributed funds to the debtor rather than creditors.
See supra notes 123--27 and accompanying text.
221 See Harris, 575 U.S. at 518--19. This would elintinate any argument
that the payments must be made under, rather than outside, the plan. See supra
notes 87, 89 and accompanying text. It would also capture payments made
from a third-party source, such as an insurance company, co-payee, or surety.
222 In re Barrera, 620 B.R. 645, 653--54 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2020), affd, No.
BAP C0-20-003, 2020 WL 5869458 (lOth Cir. BAP (Colo.) Oct. 2, 2020), aff'd,
22 F.4th 1217 (lOth Cir. 2022). The court offered the example of a hypothetical debtor who renovated his home, paid down his mortgage, and enjoyed an
uptick in market conditions to realize $275,000 in equity while the creditors
in his converted Chapter 7 case were not fully repaid and inquired why should
the debtor realize the benefit of $200,000 in nonexempt equity? The answer,
the court concluded, lay in the fundamental difference between the Chapter 7
and Chapter 13 bargains. Id.
219
220
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debtor's non-exempt assets and his chapter 13 post-petition income. And he would do so in every case in which the debtor cured
his mortgage and paid down its balance over the years he spent
in a chapter 13 case before conversion. 223

This reworking of section 348(f) would restore subsection
(1)(B) back to its original1994 form,224 thus, putting Chapter 13
on the same footing as other proceedings where the debtor retains
the debtor's property. As well as can be divined from the obscure
legislative history of the 2005 amendments,225 the aim behind
carving Chapter 13 out of subparagraph (B) had nothing to do with
changing the rules regarding allocation of appreciation upon conversion from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7. 226 Rather, the intention
was to remove the "write down and convert" strategy from debtors'
arsenals, i.e., the practice of having the value of collateral securing a claim established at confirmation for less than the full debt
and then converting after reducing the secured claim to zero.227
If the Chapter 13 valuation applied in the converted case, the
223 Id. at 654. In reaching this conclusion, the bankruptcy court in In re
Barrera examined closely an unpublished decision, In re Hayes, from its own
district that had concluded postpetition appreciation in value was always prop·
erty of the estate under sections 541(a)(1) and 541(a)(6). Id. at 654 (discussing the unpublished decision of In re Hayes, Case No. 15-20727 (Bankr. D.
Colo. March 28, 2019)). While conceding the plausibility of this position, the
court observed that:
[I]t is also reasonable to interpret this statute as a reference to
the property as it existed on the petition date. This latter interpretation fits well within the context of the Bankruptcy Code as a
whole. Numerous statutes in the Code freeze the relative rights of
the debtor, the creditors, and the estate as of the petition date.
Id. at 651. Tills reflected, according to the court, the "latent ambiguity" in
section 348(f)(1)(A). Id. at 652.
224 Compare 11 U.S.C. § 348(f) (2018), with 11 U.S.C. § 348(f) (1994).
22• See Daimler Chrysler Fin. Serv. Am. v. Miller (In re Miller), 570 F.3d
633, 639 (5th Cir. 2009) ("Even if we were to seek guidance on BAPCPA from
somewhere outside its plain language, we would be stopped by a dearth of
plain legislative history.").
22s See, e.g., In re Maynard, No. 13-62374, 2016 WL 3135069, at *5 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio May 25, 2016) (noting the treatment of allowing secured claims for
redemption in cases converted from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 changed multiple times over the course of several years and that upon conversion the difference in interest between the Chapter 13 amount and the original interest
rate of a surviving lien is owed to the creditor).
227 See supra text accompanying note 110.
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creditor would have only an unsecured claim for the remaining
balance due and the debtor would enjoy the collateral, if exempt,
free and clear.228 Subparagraph (C) accomplishes this, and the
exclusion of Chapter 13 from the rule in subparagraph (B) regarding the continuation of valuations from the pre-conversion case
was an unnecessary redundancy that could just as easily have
been accomplished by beginning the new subparagraph with preambulatory language along the lines of notwithstanding paragraph
(l)(B). 229 Instead, quite consistent with the poor draftsmanship
of the 2005 amendments overall, 230 subparagraph (C) only rendered subsection (f)(1) even more cryptic than it had been before.231
At the same time, applying the value used in the Chapter
13 plan as an initial matter to assure that appreciation stays with
the debtor would not change the result in In re Lang, 232 which
held that the debtor was not responsible for restoring to the estate
postpetition, pre-conversion depreciation in the value of property. 233
This is a product of the fact, first, that the duty under section
542(a) to turnover property of the estate to the trustee does not
include any value that the asset may have once had prior to appointment of the trustee.234 Second, it also follows directly from
22a Tills assures that the effect on secured claims of not receiving a <lischarge in
a Chapter 13 case is consistent whether the case is dismissed, converted, or
completed without a discharge because the debtor is not eligible for one. See In re
Lilly, 378 B.R. 232, 237 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2007); 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I)
(2018); see also Rethinking Chapter 13, supra note 4, at 27 (noting this as one
of several provisions adopted by BAPCPA as part of a lopsided leaning to·
ward preserving the contractual rights of secured creditors).
229 See 11 U.S. C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)--{C).
230 Jean Braucher, The Challenge to the Bench and Bar Presented by the
2005 Bankruptcy Act: Resistance Need Not Be Futile, 2007 UNN. ILL. L. REV.
93, 97 (''The problems with the 2005 Act are breathtaking. There are typos,
sloppy choices of words, hanging paragraphs and inconsistencies."); John Rao,
Testing the Limits of Statutory Construction Doctrines: Deconstructing the 2005
Bankruptcy Act, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1427, 1427 (2006) ("Most bankruptcy prac·
titioners, scholars, and courts readily agree on one thing: the 2005 Bankruptcy
Act ... is poorly drafted.'}
281 See David Gray Carlson, Cars and Homes in Chapter 13 After the 2005
Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, 14 AM. BANKR. lNST. L. REV. 301, 382--85
(2006) (referring to the 1994 amendment's version of section 348(±)(1) as "Delphic").
282 437 B.R. 70, 72 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2010).
233 Id. at 72-73; see supra text accompanying notes 53-58.
284 In re Lang, 437 B.R. at 73.
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the language in section 348(f)(1)(A) that the property of the estate in the converted Chapter 7 case consists of property in existence as of the date of the filing of the petition, "that remains
in the possession of or is under the control of the debtor on the date
of conversion." 235 Value that has dissipated due to depreciation
is no longer in the debtor's possession or under the debtor's control.236 Finally, the disparate treatment of appreciation and depreciation is consistent with the policy considerations that were
the catalyst for the adoption of section 348(£) in the 1994 amendments, namely, avoiding creation of a serious disincentive to filing
Chapter 13.237 Unquestionably, if, upon conversion to Chapter 7,
a debtor was required to make up out of postpetition earnings a
decline during the Chapter 13 case in the value of an asset in
excess of the reduction of any corresponding secured debt, any
well-advised debtor would be wary of choosing Chapter 13 in the
first place. 238

B. What to Do with Exemptions
As mentioned earlier,239 just as there is a split in the case
law over whether postpetition, pre-conversion increases in asset
values inure to the debtor or the Chapter 7 trustee on behalf of
the estate, there is also a split regarding when to determine and
value the debtor's exemptions-date of filing or date of conversion.240 As currently drafted, the statute simply does not address
11 U.S.C. § 348(t)(1)(A) (2018) (emphasis added).
Cf. In re LaFlamme, 397 B.R. 194, 203--04 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2008) ("The
Bankruptcy Code, however, does not contain any explicit provision that governs what a debtor can do with chapter 13 estate property while the debtor is
waiting to have a proposed plan confirmed. Presumably, a debtor must be able to
use earnings to pay ordinary and necessary living expenses in that interim
gap period.'l
237 See supra notes 104--07 and accompanying text.
288 Bobroffv. Cont'l Bank (In re Bobroft), 766 F.2d 797, 803 (3d Cir. 1985).
239 In re Lang, 437 B.R. at 72 ("Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 348(t)(1)(A), therefore, only that depreciated vehicle is available for administration, and any
lost depreciation is simply no longer an asset of the estate.").
240 In re Wegner, 243 B.R. 731, 733 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2000). Unlike in con·
nection with value, which date is chosen can affect not only the amount of the
exemption, but eligibility for the exemption at all. See infra note 248 and
accompanying text.
285

236

762 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:721
the question.241 In In re Wegner,242 discussed earlier,243 the court
held that the debtor is permitted to claim an exemption at the
time of conversion and that the same date governs the debtor's
eligibility for a particular exemption. 244 The matter was of some
moment in the case as the debtor was not eligible to claim a
homestead exemption at the time her Chapter 13 petition was
filed but had become so by the time of the conversion of the case.245
The court cited four separate rationales in support of its holding,
including, first, the differing nature of the roles that exemptions
play in Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 cases.246 Secondly, the court
looked to Bankruptcy Rule 1019,247 which provides that if bankruptcy schedules were not earlier filed in the Chapter 13 case,
they must be filed when the order for relief is entered in the converted Chapter 7 case.248 The court's reasoning continued that,
11 u.s.c. § 348(!) (2018).
243 B.R. at 731.
243 See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
244 In re Wegner, 243 B.R. at 735.
245 Id. at 732. At the time the debtor I:tled her Chapter 13 petition, she was
not married and had no dependents living with her, so she did not qualify for
the somewhat unusual Nebraska homestead exemption. Id. During the pendency of her Chapter 13 case, the debtor did marry, such that, at the time of
conversion, she would be eligible for the exemption if that was the appropriate time for determining exemptions. Id. at 732-33.
246 Id. at 736 (observing that both the Chapter 7 debtor and the home
mortgage holder have a financial incentive, that is lacking in Chapter 13, to
dispute and, if needed, adjudicate the value of the debtor's residence).
247 FED. R. BANKR. P. 1019(1).
248 In re Wegner, 243 B.R. at 736-37. In support of this proposition, the
court relied on the Eighth Circuit's decision in In re Lindberg, 735 F.2d 1087,
1090 (8th Cir. 1984), which held:
The Advisory Note to Rule 1019(1) explains that when the debtor
in a converted case has not previously prepared a schedule of
assets, he must do so as if a chapter 7 petition had been I:tled
on the date of conversion. Since debtors must claim exemptions
in the schedule of assets (Bankruptcy Rule 4003(a)), Rule 1019(1)
strongly suggests that the date of conversion controls what exemptions may be claimed in a converted case.
However, Lindberg was obviously decided before the 1994 amendments and,
in 2001, was overruled by the Eighth Circuit in Alexander. Alexander v. Jensen
(In re Alexander), 236 F.3d 431 (8th Cir. 2001). Note that Bankruptcy Rule
1019 was amended in 2010 to address the question of whether a new period
for filing objections arises upon conversion of case. See infra note 281 for
further discussion.
241
242
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because exemptions cannot be claimed until the schedules are
filed, the date of conversion must thus control.249
Third, the court pointed out that this approach was consistent with its holding that the equity attributable to debt reduction during the pendency of the Chapter 13 case was property
of the Chapter 7 estate. 250 That being so, it only made sense that
the exemption should likewise be determined as of the date of conversion.251 This point is a fair one assuming the court's holding
about equity build-up was correct.252 Most courts disagree.253 Moreover, the same logic breaks down when considered in relation to
the court's ruling that the market value of the debtor's residence
should be determined as of the time of the Chapter 13 petition.254
Finally, the court in Wegner observed that the Congress gave
debtors the absolute right to dismiss or convert a Chapter 13 case
in order to encourage debtors to file a Chapter 13 without adverse
consequences.255 This aim would be undermined, according to
the court, if debtors were not permitted to claim an exemption in
the converted case that came into existence after filing. 256
The opposing view concerning the timing for ascertaining
what exemptions can be claimed and the amount thereof is reflected in the decision of the bankruptcy court in In re Cofer.257
In that case, the debtor claimed in her schedules a home valued
at slightly over $100,000, a homestead exemption of $100,000,
and a mortgage lien against the property with an outstanding
principal balance of $61,073.75.258 Had the initial filing been a
In re Wegner, 243 B.R. at 736-37.
Id. at 737; see supra text accompanyjng note 36.
251 In re Wegner, 243 B.R. at 736-37.
262 See id. at 737.
263 See authorities cited supra note 81.
264 In re Wegner, 243 B.R. at 734--35.
266 See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(b); cf. Duran v. Gudino (In re Duran), 630 B.R.
797, 804 (B.AP. 9th Cir. 2021) (expressing the view that dismissal, including
a motion to dismiss a Chapter 13 case as of ''right," triggers the issue whether
"cause" exists to order that dismissal be with prejudice).
266 This is true, but, again, Wegner was a rather unique case as what was
at stake was not the amount the debtor was entitled to claim as exempt, but
rather entitlement to the exemption at all. See supra note 240 and accompa·
nyjngtext.
267 625 B.R. 194, 198 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2021).
268 Id. at 195.
249
260
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Chapter 7 case, obviously there would, on these numbers, have
been no equity for the estate.259
In Chapter 13, debtors retain their property so, as the
court pointed out in Wegner, 260 exemptions serve only as a factor
in ascertaining if the best interests test of section 1325(a)(4) is
satisfied.261 Thus, claimed exemptions are not of great moment
to unsecured creditors in the Chapter 13 case who are generally
looking to get paid out of disposable income.262 Upon conversion
some six months after confirmation of the debtor's Chapter 13
plan in Cofer, the Chapter 7 trustee sought an order (a) limiting
the debtor's homestead exemption to $32,020.56, and (b) declaring any appreciation in the value of the property to be property
of the estate.263 On the second question, as noted earlier,264 the
court found the Barrera view more persuasive then the Castleman
view, and awarded the increase in value of the debtor's residence to the debtor, without distinction as to the source of such
additional equity.265
Concurrently, the court held that, just as value is frozen
as of the date of the petition filing, so too are exemptions fixed
on that date.266 Although section 348(f)(1) does not address the
See supra note 4. Based on the scheduled value and the exemption claim,
the same would be true even if there had been no mortgage against the property.
260 In re Wegner, 243 B.R. 731, 736 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2000).
261 See 11 U.S. C. § 1325(a)(4) (requiring that unsecured creditors receive
under the debtor's Chapter 13 plan no less in present value terms than they
would have received had the estate been liquidated under Chapter 7); see also
supra note 190.
262 Except in the case of a one hundred percent payment plan, a debtor must
allocate all her projected disposable income to payment of unsecured claims in
her Chapter 13 plan for the full commitment period. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b).
268 In re Cofer, 625 B.R. at 195--96. Effectively, !intiting the exemption to
what would have been available to the debtor as of the date of filing would
have allocated both new equity due to postpetition payments on the mortgage
and market appreciation to the estate. Id. at 201.
264 See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
266 The debtor argued that the revesting language in sections 1327(b) and
(c) prevented the home in its entirety from being property of the estate. The court
rejected this contention under a plain language reading of section 348(f)(1)(A)
and to prevent creating an unnecessary inconsistency between that provision
and sections 1327(b) and (c). In re Cofer, 625 B.R. at 196-97.
266 Id. at 199 (citing Wilson v. Rigby, 909 F.3d 306, 308-09 (9th Cir. 2018));
see also In re Villescas, 632 B.R. 223, 228-29 (Bankr. D. Utah 2021) (holding that
exemptions are determined as of the date of filing, not conversion).
269
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question,267 the court turned to section 348(a), which makes clear
that, as a general rule, conversion does not change the date of
the filing of the petition or the commencement of the case.2ss The
effect of the holding was to preserve the increase in value or equity
for the debtor, which the court had said earlier belonged to the
debtor, but no more.269 Due to the amount of unused exemption
in this case, a contrary ruling would, in all likelihood, not have
changed anything.270 In another situation, however, it could impinge on the value that was supposed to inure to the estate.271

C. Value Redux
Quite clearly, my reconceptualized version of section 348(f)
goes beyond what would be minimally necessary to resolve the
disagreement between the Castleman and Barrera views.272 That
In re Cofer, 625 B.R. at 199.
Id. ('Thus, Debtor's homestead exemption remaills limited to $32,020.56-the amount this Court previously determined Debtor could claim as an ex·
emption based on the date of the petition."); see also In re Villescas, 632 B.R.
at 236-38 (finding that, as a matter of policy, section 348(f)(1)(A) applies with
equal force to exemptions to avoid attaching a penal effect to attempting re·
payment under Chapter 13).
269 In re Cofer, 625 B.R. at 202. This encourages the debtor to file Chapter
13, as intended, but, in a case, such as this one, where the applicable exemption
exceeded the debtor's equity at filing, it also prevents rewarding the debtor for
the failed Chapter 13 case at the expense of neutral treatment of the estate.
See supra note 10.
270 Effectively, that was part of the rationale for the outcome in In re Wegner,
243 B.R. 731, 737 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2000) (discussed supra text accompanying
notes 34-40), holding that the equity resulting from debt reduction under the
Chapter 13 plan was awarded to the estate, but the debtor was permitted to
claim an exemption, determined as of the date of conversion, with respect to
that equity. Id. at 736. Of course, if the property is not protected by an exemption, the debtor is simply out of luck.
271 In that scenario, the debtor could use the previously unused exemption
to claim new equity, essentially receiving twice the value of the equity reduction. In re Cofer, 625 B.R. at 199, 202. Thus, the one thing on which there seems
to be agreement, even if not recognized explicitly, is that the conclusion of
whether to use the date of filing or date of conversion for purposes of determining the value of the property, resolves the question as of what date to use
in determining exemptions. This is the "snapshot rule" referred to in In re
Cofer. Id. Where the consensus falls apart is when to take the snapshot, the
decision on whiclt then bears on who enjoys appreciation due to market forces.
See supra note 240.
272 See supra note 70.
267
268
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debate derives largely from two factors: (a) the reference in the
House Report to the example of loss of the homestead exemption
as a result of pre-conversion payments on the mortgage encumbering the property, and (b) the difference between Chapter 7
and Chapter 13 insofar as inclusion of postposition wages in the
property of the estate is concerned. 273 Thus, the issue could be
settled by amending section 348(f)(1) to conform with the example
in the House Report explaining the intent underlying enactment
of that provision in 1994-i.e., equity increases due to secured
debt reduction inured to the debtor.274 At the same time, this would
arguably harmonize section 348(f)(1)(A) with section 541(a)(6),275
effectively codifying the outcome, albeit perhaps not the holding,276 in In re Goins.277
This Article, however, has used the occasion to go a step
further and adopt the Barrera view based on a normative decision
concerning which party ought to be the beneficiary of postpetition, pre-conversion market-based appreciation.27B This Article
argues this approach is consistent with the policy considerations
that were the catalyst for section 348(f)(1) in the first place,279
and that it advances the fresh start objective that is so squarely
273 This assumes the acceptance of the rather dry doctrinal explanation that
appreciation, unlike increase in equity, is not due to use of postpetition earning. See supra note 52.
274 See supra note 81.
275 Market appreciation would fall under the basic rule of section 541(a)(6)
as a product of property of the estate, but new equity arising from payments
on secured debt, which presumably are made with postpetition earnings, would
not be included in accordance with the exclusionary language at the close of
section 546(a)(1). For another approach to reconciling the two provisions, see
supra text accompanying notes 199--200.
276 See supra text accompanying notes 44-45.
277 In re Goins, 539 B.R. 510, 516--17 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2015); see also supra
notes 41--45 and accompanying text.
278 Supra notes 60--64 and accompanying text.
279 Congress intended to equalize the treatment of a debtor in a Chapter 13
case that is subsequently converted to a Chapter 7 case with the treatment of
a debtor who filed a Chapter 7 petition originally, see In re Bostick, 400 B.R. 348,
359 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2009) (citing In re Pearson, 214 B.R. 156, 164 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1997)), thereby removing any disincentive toward voluntary repayment
plans under Chapter 13 and incentive in favor of liquidation under Chapter
7. See id. at 357 (noting the ''Bankruptcy Code's goal to encourage repayment
plans instead ofliquidation'').
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at play in Chapter 7 cases. However, there is a critical distinction
between equity derived from debt reduction and arising from
market appreciation; namely, the former is determinable with
effectively mathematical certainty, while the latter can only be
known definitively by actually selling the property in an arm'slength transaction.2BO Moreover, because of the differences between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 regarding retention of property
and exemptions,2Bl simply accepting the debtor's scheduled valuation may undercompensate creditors in the converted case.282
Therefore, a key component of the revised approach to determining property of the estate upon a Chapter 13 to Chapter 7
conversion is the opportunity for the trustee to object to the
property values and exemptions claimed in the pre-converted Chapter 13 case--effectively forcing a valuation hearing. This assumes,
of course, that such a hearing and determination, respectively,
did not occur and were not made during the course of the Chapter 13 case.2sa The resurrection of the objection window eliminates concern over the fact that the originally scheduled values
may have been deliberately understated at a stage in the proceeding where it was less likely to draw attention. 284 In effect, it
See supra note 93.
See supra notes 133, 257 and accompanying text.
282 See supra text accompanying notes 138--40.
283 See supra text accompanying note 218. One might take the same approach in a case converted from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7, but the policy considerations are different, so this Article has not proposed that in this treatment. See
In re Lang, 276 B.R. 716, 721-22 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2002). However, it is worth
noting the fresh start considerations are comparable, and while Congress has
never expressed a bias for Chapter 11 for individuals, the 2005 Act made individual Chapter 11 cases much more akin to Chapter 13 than they had been
prior to that. See Robert J. Landry, III, Individual Chapter 11 Reorganizations: Big Problems with the New "Big" Chapter 13, 29 UNN. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L. REV. 251, 252 (2007).
284 In re Jackson, 317 B.R. 511, 516 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004) (explaining as
part of the basis for rejecting the argument that when a court confirms a
Chapter 13 plan that constitutes an implicit valuation of the debtor's property,
"savvy debtors may purposely underestimate the value of real property on
their schedules, stay in chapter 13 long enough to confirm a plan, and then
convert to chapter 7 to capture the 'appreciation.' Such a result undermines
the policy of protecting appreciation by encouraging dishonest appraisals of
property value."); see Kendall v. Lynclt (In re Lynclt), 363 B.R. 101, 106 (B.AP. 9th
Cir. 2007) (''Debtors lack any motivation to list the values of assets in their
2ao
281
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assures the appreciation that the debtor is retaining is really appreciation and not value that was extant as of the date of the filing
of the petition. 285 Likewise, it would eliminate any doubt over
the Chapter 7 trustee's ability to challenge the debtor's exemption
claims and/or amounts when what is at stake-unlike in Chapter
13---is removal of the property from the estate. 286 In either case,
it would also be a preferable substitute for establishing actual
schedules at any higher amounts than necessary to satisfy the requirements
of good faith.").
285 It will be recalled that this may have been an issue in In re Castleman,
631 B.R. 914, 915 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2021).
286 See In re Hines, No. 07-50587, 2008 WL 2783351, at *1 (M.D.N.C. July 15,
2008). For many years, the courts were split over the question of whether
conversion from an individual rehabilitation proceeding to a Chapter 7 case
triggered a new period for objecting to exemptions. Compare Bell v. Bell (In re
Bell), 225 F.3d 203, 211 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that the conversion of a case
from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7 does not trigger a renewed period for filing objections to property claimed as exempt during the Chapter 11 proceeding), with
In re Brown, 375 B.R. 362, 368 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2007) (reasoning that the
30-day period under Rule 4003(b) to object to a debtor's claimed exemptions
starts anew upon the conversion). In 2010, the Advisory Committee's recommendation of a Rule 1019(2)(B}--providing for the commencement of a new
limitations period under Rule 4003(b) after a case has been converted to Chap·
ter 7-was approved by the Supreme Court. In re Gnadt, No. 11-10378-BFK,
2015 WL 2194475, at *4 (Bankr. E.D. Va. May 7, 2015); see FED. R. BANKR. P.
1019(2)(B). This resolves, "with certain exceptions," the question of whether the
Chapter 7 trustee-in a case that was converted from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7has a new thirty-day period to object to debtor's exemption claims after the
creditors' meeting in a converted case. See In re Gnadt, 2015 WL 2194475, at *4
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2075). The rule does not, nor could it without violating the
Rules Enabling Act (28 U.S.C. § 2075), provide whether the debtor's eligibility
for an exemption and the validity of the amount claimed must be determined
as of the date that the original Chapter 13 petition was filed or the date of
conversion. See id. In its present form, Rule 1019(2)(B) has survived challenge on
the ground that it affected a substantive right. See id. (explaining why there
is no conflict between Bankruptcy Rule 1019(2)(B) and section 522(l)). Addi·
tionally, Rule 1019(2)(B) "does not apply if the case [is] converted to Chapter
7 more than one year after [the] entry of the first order confirming a plan under
[c]hapter 11 ... or 13."); Brsdy v. Maxus Healthcare Partners, LLC (In re Brady),
795 Fed. App'x. 940, 942 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam). The exception is appar·
ently intended to ensure finality regarding exemption claims in rehabilitation
proceedings. See id. Obviously, enactment of section 348(±)(1) as proposed would
require a corresponding amendment to remove that exception. See supra text
accompanying note 218.
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value and equity via an arm's-length sale resulting in loss of the
property; the value of which to the debtor might go beyond purely
economic considerations. 287
While it may seem that providing this opportunity to the
trustee operates as an unfair second bite at the apple, it is not
truly a second bite for two reasons. First, the Chapter 7 trustee,
of course, had no opportunity to contest value in the earlier case. 288
Second, the motivations of other parties in the Chapter 13 case to
scrutinize and possibly challenge the debtor's scheduled valuations
of both assets and exemptions were different.2B9 Undoubtedly, the
trustee might accomplish the same thing by forcing a valuation
hearing in connection with the debtor's motion for abandonment
after conversion of the case, a move that a well-represented debtor
should take if there is some doubt over the reliability of the earlier valuation or the prospect of post-conversion appreciation.290
In addition, any party in interest may compel a valuation hearing
under Bankruptcy Rules 3012 and 4003(b) concerning, respectively,
the amount of secured claims and exemption claims. 291 However,
uncertainties surrounding bar and measurement dates in a converted case, 292 possible discrepancies over which party bears the
burden of proof, 293 and no clear procedures for judicial resolution
287 See Exemption Impairing Liens, supra note 12, at 47 (citing BFP v. Resol.
Tr. Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 537-38 (1994)). Of course, that will happen nonetheless,

if the value as of the date of the petition's filing is determined to exceed the
sum of any liens against the property and the applicable exemption. See id. at
29 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(A) (1994)).
288 See In re Lynch, 363 B.R. at 106.
289 See supra notes 137-38, 277 and accompanying text.
290 In re Barrera, 620 B.R. 645, 654 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2020), aff'd, No. BAP
C0-20-003, 2020 WL 5869458 (lOth Cir. BAP (Colo.) Oct. 2, 2020), aff'd, 22
F.4th 1217 (lOth Cir. 2022) (making a similar point about avoiding the loss to
the estate of post-conversion appreciation when there is an expectation that the
estate will remain open for longer than the usual course of a Chapter 7 case).
29t FED. R. BANKR. P. 3012, 4003(b).
292 See supra note 281.
293 See In re Solly, 392 B.R. 692, 697 n.6 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2008) (citing In
re Brown, 244 B.R. 603, 609 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2000)). Under Bankruptcy Rule
4003(c), the party objecting to an exemption bears the burden of proof. FED.
R. BANKR. P. 4003(c). Bankruptcy Rule 3012 does not address burden of proof,
but there is case law holding that, under certain circumstances, the debtor has
the burden of proof at a Rule 3012 valuation hearing. See In re Solly, 392 B.R.
at 697 n.6 (citing In re Brown, 244 B.R. at 609).
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of valuation disputes regarding assets not securing a claim;294 all
auger in favor of a single, uniform process for determining contested asset valuations after a Chapter 13 case is converted to
Chapter 7.295
It is true, and designedly so, that the issue would entail
ascertainment of a historical, not a current value, but that should
not present an insuperable barrier if property was undervalued
to any meaningful extent in the earlier Chapter 13 case.296 The
trustee would just have an opportunity to look the situation over.
Presumably, unless there are serious misgivings over the value
294 See Karaan E. Thomas, Valuation of Assets in Bankruptcy Proceedings:
Emerging Issues, 51 MONT. L. REV. 126, 129 (1990). Asset valuation hearings
in bankruptcy arise frequently and in different ways and different contexts.
Id. at 127. For instance, if an asset is not encumbered, but there is a dispute
over whether any equity exists over and above the exemption in the property
to which the debtor is entitled, a valuation hearing of some type will occur, but
there is no regularity to the process. Bond v. CIT Grp./Sales Fin., Inc. (In re
Bond), No. NC-05-1316-KRyB, 2006 WL 6810941, at *1 (BAP. 9th Cir. Apr. 26,
2006). Likewise, valuations occur regularly in connection with relief from stay
motions. In re Jackson, 317 B.R. 511, 517 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004). By having a
statutory provision allowing for an objection to the debtor's scheduled value
in the prior Chapter 13 case-in the same fashion that section 522(!) provides
for an objection to the debtor's exemption claims-the process would gradually
become more regularized and uniform. See infra text accompanying note 296;
11 u.s.c. § 522(1).
295 See supra text accompanying note 218. That rule being that postpetition, preconversion increase in value for whatever reasons inures to the debtor in
cases converted from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7. However, the Chapter 7 trustee
has thirty days after the creditors' meeting in the converted case to contest (1)
the debtor's scheduled values, and (2) the debtor's eligibility for and entitlement
to claimed exemptions determined as of the date that the original Chapter 13
petition was filed. See supra text accompanying note 218. Logically, it makes
sense for the same rule to apply to conversions of individual cases from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7. This is due to the fact that the 2005 Act made all property
acquired by the debtor after commencement of the case property of the estate
in individual Chapter 11 cases under 11 U.S.C. § 1115(a), so property of the estate
includes postpetition property. See Landry, supra note 283, at 263-64. However,
there is no comparable congressional policy favoring Chapter 11 over Chapter 7
as exists with Chapter 13, and most notably, section 348(±)(1), unlike Bankruptcy Rule 1019(2)(B), applies only when the case is converted from Chapter
13. See supra text accompanying notes 105-08. Thus, the issue is a matter for
another day. See also supra text accompanying note 279.
296 In re Jackson, 317 B.R. at 517 (pointing out that it "is not uncommon''
for bankruptcy courts to have to determine historical values).
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accepted but not affirmatively challenged in the Chapter 13 proceeding-such as perhaps in a case like In re Castleman297-the
Chapter 7 trustee would abandon the property. 298 In addition,
the prospect of a formal consideration of value in the converted
case should have a salutary in terrorem effect on manipulative
gamesmanship in the initial invocation of Chapter 13.299
The process would work like an objection to a discharge
under section 727(c)300 or an objection to exemptions claimed under section 522(1). 301 This means adoption of rules to govern the
time for filing, burden of proof, and other procedures for resolution.302 Ideally, however, while the objecting party should bear
the burden of proof, it is unnecessary to have the determination
made with the formality of an adversary proceeding as is true
with respect to most objections to discharge.303 Instead, it would
be raised by motion and determined as a contested matter.304 Having thus provided the opportunity for judicial oversight of the
integrity of the values listed in the debtor's schedules as of the date
of filing the Chapter 13 petition, the logic of both Congress's clear
intention in adopting section 348(f)(1),305 and the Supreme Court's
reasoning in determining who is entitled to undistributed funds 306
would control. In short, without risk of unfair prejudice to creditors, appreciation in value would be used to catalyze the debtor's
297 631 B.R. 914, 915--16 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2021) (where, as scheduled, the
sum of the unavoidable lien against the property and the exemption to which
the debtors were entitled exceeded the value of the property as claimed by the
debtors, and yet, according to the trustee, the property was worth forty percent more than the amount the debtors had valued the property at only two
years earlier).
298 See 11 U.S.C. § 554(a)-(b).
299 See In re Wegner, 243 B.R. 731, 733 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2000).
aoo 11 U.S.C. § 727(c)(1)--(2).
30t See 11 U.S.C. § 522(1); see, e.g., FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003, 4004.
302 See, e.g., FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003, 4004. Because the procedure for ex·
emptions already exists in Bankruptcy Rule 4003(b), no additional effort would be
required. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003. Instead, the proposal would clarify that
the window for objecting reopens after conversion. See supra text accompanying
note 281.
303 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(4).
304 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014(a).
805 See supra notes 65--66 and accompanying text.
808 Harris v. Viegelahn, 575 U.S. 510, 518--19 (2015); see supra notes 125--27
and accompanying text.
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fresh start.307 And this would be true regardless of whether attributable to acquisition with use of postpetition earnings (whether
in the form of secured debt reduction or property improvement)
or appreciation due to market factors.
CONCLUSION

Although section 348(f)(1)(A) resolved the question of whether
property acquired postpetition becomes property of the estate in
a Chapter 7 case converted from Chapter 13, it did not address
two collateral questions. The first question-who is entitled to
undistributed funds from the Chapter 13 case-was resolved by the
Supreme Court consistent with the same policy objectives that
Congress clearly identified as giving rise to the enactment of section 348(£)(1) in 1994. 308 The second question-who is entitled to
appreciation in the value of property owned on the petition datehas caused a deep schism in the case law and that issue remains
unresolved.309 While there are several intermediary positions, the
antipodal extremes are all net increases in value of the debtor's
property either stay with the debtor or they become the estate's
property.alO Both positions are plausible but neither addresses
all of the concerns implicated by the question because of inadequacies in the current statutory scheme. 311
Accordingly, a revised version of section 348(£) has been
put forward that resolves the issue in a manner that is in harmony
with the strong public policy considerations in consumer bankruptcy cases.a12 In addition, it clarifies the currently unaddressed
question of corresponding timing for determining exemptions,
promotes greater harmony among Code provisions, and assures
that the decision to allow the debtor to retain equity acquired
807 In re Cofer, 625 B.R. 194, 202 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2021). Effectively, this
would endorse the Barrera view, or "snapshot rule," as articulated by the Court
in In re Cofer. See id. at 199. The point is to make the debtor no worse off than
had he or she filed Chapter 7 from the get-go but, at the same time, not to make
the debtor better off, which is why the snapshot must encompass both property
value and exemptions. See supra note 267.
80B See Harris, 575 U.S. at 517-18.
309 See In re Castleman, 631 B.R. 914, 916-17 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2021).
810 See id.
au See supra text accompanying notes 22-26.
812 See supra text accompanying notes 214--18.
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during the Chapter 13 case does not come at the expense of the
Chapter 7 trustee and unsecured creditors. ala Of course, the other,
not trivial, benefit of this proposal is that it would eliminate the
costly and harmful division and disharmony that now exist across
the country over whether postpetition, pre-conversion appreciation in property is included in the Chapter 7 estate. 314 That, in
and of itself, is a very good thing.

"'"See supra text accompanying notes 272--77.
st• See supra text accompanying notes 19--26.

